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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Theme 
”’Arianism’ has often been regarded as the archetypal Christian deviation, something 
aimed at the very heart of the Christian confession (Williams 2005:1).” With these words 
archbishop Rowan Williams (1950 -) begins his magnum opus: Arius – heresy and tradition. 
The first edition of this book was published in 1987, and has since then been published in a 
second edition (2001), and a third impression (2005). While the book deals with the Arian 
heresy, what made it stand out was how it portrayed Arius as someone who perhaps had been 
given an unjustly bad rap. As he began saying, this event strikes at the heart of the Christian 
confession – and thus any re-presentation of Arius is a touchy one. So why do it? Why not let 
the past be the past? The answer to this is also found in that first phrase: this has to do with 
the heart of the Christianity. 
 What is the heart of Christianity? Well, to paraphrase, it has to do with the core of 
what Christianity is believed to be. However, this statement only serves to provoke a new 
question: Who is to say what that core is? The term ‘Christian’ can be used quite widely, and 
it has no copyright. Any group can claim to be Christian. By lacking a distinct marker to 
separate between what the word can and cannot mean, it in essence revokes the word of any 
meaning. It thus appears the meaning of ‘Christian’ is constructed by consensus. Fortunately, 
this does not hold up to closer scrutiny. The church has since the term ‘Christians’ was first 
used worked towards a defining identity – a symbolum. Even theology can be said to be an 
attempt to make sense of the church’s persona in light of its worship and tradition. Williams 
deals with these questions in his book why study the past? from 2005. “Some of what we 
have just been thinking about opens up the question of authority on the church – not so much 
the actual executive structures of the community as the criteria to which appeal can be made 
in identifying the boundaries of what counts as Christian” (Williams 2005: 104). He later adds 
to this by stating that one cannot be a Christian without the bible or the history of its reading 
(105). Nothing is suspended in thin air. The heart of Christianity is based on the church’s 
tradition of trying to define itself, and this is verbalized in its doctrines. 
Rowan Williams, in the same book, draws upon examples from church history to 
illustrate the role history plays in the formation of a Christian identity. For instance, there 
seems to have been a great emphasis on heroes and villains in the struggles and confrontations 
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leading up to the reformation - the church had been hijacked and the theologians had to sort 
through the debris to uncover the truth. Eventually protestant radicals in Italy and Poland 
asked how we could know that the major themes of theology – like the trinity and the 
incarnation – had not been corrupted. (Williams 2005:21). How one understood the story of 
the church had a huge impact on how one viewed the role of theology. History, doctrine and 
identity are, according to Williams, closely tied together – as will soon become apparent. And 
if that is the case, then this will have ramifications on how we deal with doctrine. 
 How such factors – history, doctrine and identity – influenced the formation of the 
Christological doctrine is what Williams addresses in Arius. By demonstrating how doctrine 
cannot be regarded as separate from other factors, but rather must be viewed as the result of a 
complex set of circumstances, he also draws attention to how doctrinal theology needs to 
tackle these issues; issues pertaining to what doctrines can be said to be. To understand a 
doctrine one has to come to terms with the hermeneutics of that doctrine: how this doctrine 
came to be and to what questions it attempts to present an answer. One has to interact with the 
doctrine – to allow it to speak. It needs to speak in its own voice, being different, as well as 
communicating in the present, being same. Just how the development of the Christological 
doctrine can do just this – engage us yet again - is what I believe can be clarified by tackling 
the Arian struggle, as Rowan Williams presents it. 
1.2 Thesis problem  
This thesis will try to tackle some of the issues brought to attention by an investigation 
into how Rowan Williams deals with doctrine – more specifically how he deals with the 
Arian controversy surrounding the formation of the Christological doctrine. This is interesting 
because it appears that he addresses this issue from a slightly different angle than what has 
traditionally been employed. That is; he attempts to present a picture of Arius not distorted by 
the polemic of Athanasius (Williams 2005a:234). By getting a more accurate picture of what 
the conflict was actually about, we are better equipped to see how we have been influenced by 
it, and perhaps how we should be influenced in the future. This in turn might help doctrinal 
theology to be more than a commentary on past statements. If all that needs to be said is said, 
then the critical theologian has little room for manoeuvring when trying to make old doctrine 
speak with a new voice. At the same time the critical theologian cannot extract any meaning 
from the doctrines as he sees fit. That would reduce Christian theology to nothing more than 
empty statements of a subjective nature. Theology must be based on a foundation that makes 
it meaningful to speak of a theology as ‘Christian’.  
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Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to give an all-encompassing answer to 
these concerns, I hope shedding light on a few relevant issues might reveal something as to 
how this undertaking can enrich and renew doctrinal theology. 
1.2.1 Problem statement  
In what way can Rowan Williams’ dealings with the Arian controversy, and the 
subsequent formation of the Christological doctrine, give greater understanding to the 
process surrounding the formation of doctrine? 
This thesis attempts to use Rowan Williams as a platform for dealing with issues 
pertaining to doctrinal theology. Williams is chosen for this task in part because of his 
reputation as a renowned scholar, and in part because of the way he addresses the topic. Arius 
proposed not just a fresh perspective on the person of Arius, it also interacted with certain 
modern concerns pertaining to doctrinal validity. Thus, by examining how Williams dealt 
with all of this, it might be possible to get a constructive dialogue going as to how doctrines 
are to be viewed.  
This thesis has a hermeneutical agenda. It will attempt to deconstruct concepts that are 
felt as limiting when trying to make sense of a modern ‘Christian’ identity. It might appear 
that this is an attempt to have the doctrine say something it never did – and never meant to. 
The danger of opening up a doctrine is that one is in acute danger of reading oneself into the 
text, instead of having the text speak with it’s own voice. Be that as it may, an equally 
dangerous view is to think that a text is speaking with it’s own voice when in fact it is 
speaking with the voice of the first reader. Critical theology is trying to meet these and other 
concerns by giving a greater attention to hermeneutics. That is also what this thesis is trying 
to do: allow hermeneutics to open the understanding of doctrine, so that, hopefully, it can 
speak with something closer to its own voice. 
From this original problem statement additional questions can be drawn. These 
questions will help clarify the scope of this thesis, and will help bring clarity both to 
methodology and structure. The first question to arise is of course regarding Rowan Williams 
– the subjective element in the presentation of Arius. Next it is natural to ask more 
specifically about the event in question, and about what factors can be said to have influenced 
doctrine. Lastly it is interesting to see how all of this relates to where we are today, standing 
 8 
in the junction between the greater society and the church. With this in mind, the questions 
are: 
1. What kind of hermeneutical platform does Williams build in his dealings with the 
material? 
The way Williams presents his dealings with Arius also follows a specific set of 
hermeneutical presuppositions. These presuppositions relate to history, identity, and 
theological intention. In regards to history, Williams has a distinct way of viewing its role, 
which is closely linked to identity. This again ties in with Williams’ own identity, and how he 
understands his role as a theologian. Talking about a theologian you quickly start to address 
that theologians agenda – or his intention if you will. These presuppositions is commented on 
by Williams’ himself in the introduction to his book from 2000; On Christian Theology and 
will be presented later. 
2. What does the material, as presented by Rowan Williams, say about the formation of 
doctrine? 
As Williams points out, Arius is in many ways considered the arch-heretic; a prime 
example of theology gone bad. Proverbially speaking, he was hung from the city walls by his 
neck as a prime example of what happens to those who dare oppose established doctrine. He 
is, in fact, the reason why we need an established doctrine. It follows therefore that a closer 
look at what he said, and why he said it, is in order. To distinguish what Arius said it is also 
necessary to view it against what he didn’t say; that is, the case his opponents argued. By 
looking at what they said, and why they said it, the hermeneutical influences in the formation 
of a Christological doctrine will become more apparent. This is all done in Williams’ book 
Arius – heresy and tradition. Again, this thesis is not on the Arian controversy but on 
Williams’ dealings with this event, and what can be learned from it. It follows therefore that 
the material in question is only interesting as far as it reveals something about this specific 
topic. 
3. What kind of implications can be drawn from this view on doctrine as it relates to 
current hermeneutical issues? 
The current issues that will be dealt with are those of a historicist nature. Doctrines 
present themselves as truth claims, but how can this be merited considering the historical 
nature of doctrine? If we cannot say anything true, then can we say anything at all? Is 
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Christianity, and truth, simply a matter of consensus? Do we, in our world constructing, make 
truth an impossible concept? These are some of the concerns that need to be addressed.  
If a case has been made for the influence of hermeneutics in the formation of doctrine, 
then a very interesting question can be posed: can we deduce a relevant Christological 
understanding by employing the intellectual constraints of that era? By intellectual 
constraints I mean that the way they thought regarding certain issues were connected with 
their time and place in history. They spoke to the limit of their understanding, the same as we 
do today. The question is if their understanding has any prerogative over how we now see 
things. If all we do is try to think as they did, within their hermeneutical framework, will we 
then be able to let doctrine speak with a voice closer to our own – or will we simply repeat 
what they said? The natural conclusion to this question if of course that we cannot stop at 
what was once said. The past had its limitations, same as the present – and it is these 
limitations we must move beyond.  
This thesis is not written with the intention of juxtaposing heresy and orthodoxy per 
se. The intention is to investigate into the possibility of opening up “the message” for fresh 
interpretations. It’s not to discard what is already there, but to reveal more of it – to shake the 
box and see what falls out. It is my conviction that what falls out will be the good news. 
1.3 Material 
 The primary material chosen to form the base for this thesis will of course be found in 
the writings of Rowan Williams himself. To narrow the scope even further, it follows that 
only the material that reveals something about how Williams deals with doctrine are relevant. 
Seeing as it is Williams' presentation of the Christological event that is in questions, the 
primary material will not include historical sources pertaining to the event. While the full 
bibliography can be found at the end of this thesis, some of the material used deserves to be 
highlighted due to the weight it receives in this thesis. The foundation for this whole thesis is 
of course Arius – Heresy and Tradition (2005a). This book is treated extensively, and so 
holds a position not comparable to the remaining material. Another book of Williams treated 
in its entirety is Why study the past?: the quest for the historical church (2005b). This forms a 
basis for how I present Williams’ view on history as relating to identity. 
The secondary material used to analyse Williams comes from a variety of sources. I 
use, to a large extent, articles found in peer-reviewed journals throughout this thesis, relevant 
to the topic being treated. When dealing with Williams I also sometimes lean on Mike 
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Higton’s Difficult gospel: the theology of Rowan Williams, but I do this sparingly. I do, 
however, attempt to use more of Williams’ own writings, like On Christian Theology (2000), 
or Wrestling with angels (2007), edited by Mike Higton, when attempting to clarify Williams' 
position. Also, some of Williams’ sermons are employed, though this is done with a specific 
agenda in mind; it is accessed once again for the purpose of clarifying Williams’ position 
when dealing with a specific topic. Even though the writings of Williams are primary sources 
– of the authors hand – I define them as secondary material because of the limited treatment 
they receive. I might have done them injustice in not allowing them to have their full say, 
though hopefully I have not distorted their voice. 
 
What is also deserving of attention is the use of other sources, not directly dealing with 
Williams, which I employ when doing a comparative analysis regarding his position viewed 
against contemporary concerns. These sources may not have been given the complete 
attention they deserve, but I hope I have dealt with them respectfully. When dealing with 
Williams and linguistic approach to doctrine, I access George A. Lindbeck and his book The 
nature of doctrine: religion and theology in a postliberal age (1984). In this respect I also 
consult Alister E. McGrath, and how he treats Lindbeck, in The Genesis of doctrine: a study 
in the foundations of doctrinal criticism (1997). When presenting the challenge of historicism 
I do this, in part, by way of Sheila Greeve Davaney and her Pragmatic historicism: a theology 
for the twenty first century (2000). These authors serve as backbone in presenting the 
challenges towards doctrinal theology. In attempting to answer these challenges I receive help 
from Anthony C. Thiselton and his The hermeneutics of doctrine (2007). For a full 
bibliography I once again invite the reader to the complete listing at the end of this thesis. 
1.4 Method 
 This thesis is written in the field of systematic theology, and it follows a systematic / 
hermeneutical approach in dealing with the theme. By this it follows that I will analyse the 
material in question in a systematic fashion, and by this analysis develop an answer to the 
thesis problem. The hermeneutical aspect is evident in that I will study and discuss the role of 
interpretation in dealing with the material. First I will analyse how Williams interprets not 
only the material, but also the role of history itself. Then I will analyse how, according to 
Williams, the fourth century theologian interpreted the Christ event (in relation to the 
Trinitarian doctrine). The analysis of intention then stretches to doctrines in general, and how 
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they are to be understood. At the end of this thesis I present my interpretation of how one 
might position oneself in relation to the findings in this thesis. 
 Williams makes uses of a historical/cultural analysis, as well as a contextual analysis, 
in Arius. He discusses how Arius’ historical situation influenced Arius’ theology, as well as 
his supporters and opponents. Arius writings, which by and large are only accessible through 
his enemies, are attempted restored and analysed with the intention of revealing his 
interpretive framework – his hermeneutical position so to speak. This is also what is done 
with Williams. 
1.5 Structure 
The structure of this thesis is as follows: In chapter two Williams’ own hermeneutical 
presuppositions will be dealt with. This chapter will analyze how he views history as 
connected to identity, and what ramifications this has on how doctrines are to be understood. 
Chapter three and four analyses how Williams presents the historical events surrounding the 
Arian controversy. While the initial chapter presents Arius’ less controversial notions - that is, 
Arius as a conservative - the latter deals with what made him thought of as a heretic – his 
radicalness, so to speak. In chapter five some of the current doctrinal concerns will be 
presented, and Williams will be discussed in relation to these. The result of this aims to reveal 
some of the concerns that needs to be dealt with for the theologian who wishes to deal 
respectably with doctrine. This leads to chapter six, where a summary is presented, as well as 
an attempted proposal of how the concerns of chapter five can be met. The final chapter - 
seven - aims to answer the questions posed in the introduction to this thesis, as well as 
presenting suggestions for further study.  
I will not be venturing in on a discussion of Williams’ use of sources, and his 
interpretations of them. This would be too momentous a task for a thesis of this size. The 
theories presented by Williams will, to an extent, be taken at face value and discussed 
accordingly. This thesis deals with issues relating to hermeneutics and will not enter in on 
topics related to church history. 
1.6 Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate into what influenced the formation the 
Christological doctrine, from the perspective of Rowan Williams. This is done in order to see 
if it is possible to open up the message to reveal more of what is already there. Several 
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doctrines are today being questioned, both from within and from outside the church. How can 
the truth claims in doctrines be respected, while at the same time acknowledging that truth is, 
ontologically speaking, inaccessible? Also, is it possible to give critique of the content of a 
doctrine while not necessarily attacking the truth they are said to contain? Is there a difference 
between the words and the content? Further, is what is being question not ‘the doctrine’, but 
rather the interpretation of this doctrine – an interpretation intermingled with the presentation 
of what it is said to contain? Are the challenges a threat to the heart of Christianity, or are they 
a positive aid in helping to open up the claims of Christianity? It just might be that answering 
all of these questions might help separate between the content of doctrine, and the 
hermeneutical tools used to make sense of this content. 
 One of theology’s primary tasks is to self-scrutinize – to make sure the orthopraxis 
aligns with orthodoxy. It is an occupation directed towards uncovering the truth. This is 
especially true when talking about Christ, and the revelation he is said to reveal. Now, it 
might just be that the doctrine of Christ is not dependent upon the hermeneutical factors of 
times past. The purpose of this thesis is not to discuss the validity of the Christological 
doctrine, but rather to investigate into how the truth within the doctrines can be dealt with – to 
uncover what is covered, reveal what is hidden – in order to do justice to the truth theology is 
claiming to uphold.  
1.7 To the reader 
 An introduction is always in order when meeting someone for the first time, and as 
Rowan Williams might not be known to every reader, it might be a good idea to do just that. 
Rowan Douglas Williams (1950) is the Archbishop of Canterbury, a position he has held 
since 2003. Before taking on this office he has been a lecturer in divinity at the University of 
Cambridge (1983), and was later appointed to the Lady Margaret Professorship of Divinity 
and Canon of Christ Church at the University of Oxford. His Doctor of divinity was awarded 
him in 1989.1
 Rowan Williams is not always an easy writer to access, and this is also true of his 
book Arius. The late Lloyd G. Patterson of Cambridge wrote in his review of Arius that  
 
…one of the difficulties which a reviewer encounters in dealing with the work is that Dr. 
Williams’ views so regularly emerge out of his judicious criticisms of the views of others that 
                                                             
1 LAMBETH-PALACE. About Rowan Williams: Biography [Online]. Available: 
http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/73 [Accessed 11.04 2011]. 
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it is difficult to extract them without oversimplification, if not distortion. But then, this is not 
an easy book, either to read or to review. It is simply a very good book, and a very important 
one. (Patterson 1989) 
I have attempted in this thesis to simplify the complexity of this book, and present the major 
arguments as I see them. I do, however, by this realise that I might be in danger of doing just 
what Patterson warns about. I hope I have not oversimplified too much, or that I am guilty of 
too much distortion, but in this I call for reader awareness. In any case I hope that the reader, 
as well as myself, shall come out from the experience with a greater sense of maturity. 
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Chapter 2: The hermeneutics of Rowan Williams 
2.1 Introduction 
In the introduction to this thesis, after presenting the problem statement, three 
questions were asked. The first of these was: What kind of hermeneutical platform does 
Williams build in his dealings with the material? To answer this question additional 
clarifications might be helpful. It was stated that Williams presents his dealings with Arius in 
accordance with a specific set of hermeneutical presuppositions relating to history, identity, 
and theological intention. This statement needs to be investigated. I will first deal with these 
interlocking issues, before moving on to tackle how Williams views the role of tradition, and 
what his theological intention is. The final section will be on what part doctrines play in his 
theology. 
2.2 History 
Rowan Williams views history as a construction. It is a construction because it is 
based on decisions of judgement; judgements made based on how the writers of this history 
view the world. As Williams says: “We don’t have a single grid for history; we construct it 
when we want to resolve certain problems about who we are now” (Williams 2005b:5). This 
construction is a world construction – it is the framework making it possible to organize 
events into a sensible whole. For example, by writing 2010 on the front page of this thesis I 
have revealed several judgement calls – like using a Christian timeline instead of a Chinese 
one. Davaney states that Gordon Kaufman calls humans world creators in that we evidently 
interpret the world on a grander scale; we do not interpret reality locally (Davaney 2000:83). 
Humans need an overarching narrative they can relate to, and this narrative is in the continual 
process of being constructed. 
This construction is closely related to identity. ‘We’ construct history so that it makes 
sense even speaking about a ‘we’. The writers of the New Testament needed such a 
‘construction’ – or re-construction - in order to make sense of the apparent conflict between a 
Hebrew history, the Christ event, and the role of the gentiles. According to Williams it is at 
times like these that you begin to write history – when you no longer can take for granted that 
things are the same. A crisis event can create a rupture in identity for a group, which then 
needs to be mended, and this will spur on the writing of history (Williams 2005b:8). It is a 
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question of how to make sense of the way one perceives himself when taking into 
consideration the other events taking place on this constructed grid. 
 I believe a helpful illustration can be found in cognitive dissonance theory, which I 
borrow from psychology.2 Cognitive dissonance theory says that a crucial factor in 
determining our behaviour, or motivation, is our need to reduce a feeling of dissonance. 
Holding two or more incompatible beliefs simultaneously is what causes this dissonance. The 
need to see oneself as consistent will make the individual take steps in order to remove the 
discord, or enhance the consistency.3
Openness is important for Williams, because this is what makes learning possible – 
which is the foundation for growth, or maturity. There is a need for an historical awareness 
that incorporates the strangeness of the past, while at the same time not treat it as if it was 
beyond our grasp (Williams 2005:11). Good history is meant to provoke thought by re-
presenting what one thought one knew. Because it is different, we are able to learn from it. 
Williams wants to keep it open by challenging its familiarity– to avoid closing it by making it 
the same. Strangeness is needed to learn, as learning, by definition, is having something 
previously not part of ones world, become part of that world.  
 In other words, if you have a notion of God as exclusive 
(Hebrew God) and need to make that fit with a notion of God as inclusive (Gentile 
Christians), then the way to go about it is to write a history unifying the two. One example 
can be seen with Marcion, another with Origen, and, of course, as should soon be evident, 
Arius. The problem with using cognitive dissonance theory in theology is that it does not 
make value judgments – nor does it claim to. It cannot say that one theory is more truthful 
than the next. All it can say is that it removed some of the tension. Thus, Marcion and Origen 
are equally justified in their attempts to write theology out of history. Is, then, this approach to 
history flawed? Not necessarily, because history does not record truth, as such, but events. 
That the event happened might be true, but the meaning of the event is left open. In returning 
to Williams, this view of history as open will be of paramount importance. 
To elaborate on this, I will briefly look closer at the phenomenon ‘learning’. Learning 
is only possible where something outside of me, something not me, has been presented to me 
                                                             
2 McGrath points out that a cognitive psychological understanding of doctrine might have important, insights 
into a cognitive understanding of doctrine MCGRATH, A. E. 1997. The Genesis of doctrine: a study in the 
foundations of doctrinal criticism, Grand Rapids, Mich., Eerdmans., although there is not time to develop this 
here. 
3 For further treatment I refer to PRATKANIS, A. R. 2007. The Science of social influence: advances and future 
progress, New York, Psychology Press..  
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in a manner I can grasp. The unknown must be made known. This encounter results in a 
change in me that could not have occurred by my own hand. It had to be presented to me - to 
show me what I did not have or could not be. Seeing as this was completely outside me – was 
an Other to me – I could only experience the change by having it accepted as a gift. How then 
is this gift to be presented? Well, an answer that would be in accordance with what has 
already been stated - and in line with what Williams is driving at - is that history is the 
medium for this change, or ex-change, to take place. History is what presents the unknown to 
me, and by so doing it forces me to remain open towards the world. This openness is only 
possible by the unknown being similar enough for me to recognize it as what it is. Christ is 
the unknown made into known flesh. By living within this duality of strangeness and 
similarity theology is forced to remain open. Williams might well be justified in stressing 
strangeness if we want theology to be something other than archaeology. 
In returning to the crisis event that opens up the old history by rupturing it, and thus 
creating the need for a new one, Williams says: 
Thus what we read in the New Testament is not a simple record of what happened, but also a 
hugely creative and innovative attempt to make one story out of a set of memories that covers 
events of great disruptive force. Jesus brings the earlier history to a climax, yet in such a way 
that the history is seen quite differently; what matters in the earlier story will be different 
depending on the point of view of the telling, and passages and incidents that did not 
necessarily occupy the foreground now take on fresh significance. (Williams 2005b:7) 
There is now a new key for interpreting God’s history – The Christ event. This event made it 
necessary to review and reinterpret the existing story of Gods dealings with ‘his people.’ Even 
that phrase, ‘his people’, took on a radical new meaning as the news of the Christ event 
spread. Williams ties this up to heresy, and states that because of Christ the world has been 
broken up, and reassembled. The greatest danger now is for something to disrupt this new 
balance by “driving wedges between what has been carefully stitched together by way of 
much paradox and skilful redefinition” (Williams 2005b:8). Heresy is by this definition: an 
act of rebellion against the currently accepted narrative that can threaten the identity of the 
church. 
The interesting aspect of what Williams describes is that he appears to view heresy as 
something beneficial – perhaps even necessary – for the growth of the church. A crisis event 
disrupts the current accepted paradigm and from this crisis a new identity structure forms. 
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This change leads to greater maturity, but it does not happen without conflict. The main 
objective for the people who are making the current paradigm the accepted one is peace. 
Nobody is to rock the boat, and if they do they will be ostracized and given the identity of 
heretics. By this view it appears the heretic is actually the hero of the story.  
The ‘heretic hero’ is a danger Williams is well aware of. He addresses the issue in his 
introduction to Arius when describing the difficulty in reconstructing the life of Arius. Arius 
has been ‘demonized’ for so long that one might be tempted to correct the balance by turning 
Arius into a theological hero (Williams 2005a:2). This temptation is further dealt with by 
Williams in why study the past?, where he reflects on how the reformed church saw the 
persecuted minority as the true church, vis-à-vis the false Catholic Church. Arius is no hero, 
because Williams’ primary focus when dealing with the event is not a man – the hero can 
never be ‘a man’ – the ‘hero’ is ‘difference’; thus it is every man, at every time. 
History is, for Williams, the ‘heroic difference’ allowing identity to develop. It enables 
the process of maturity. As he states it:  
We begin with a sense of identity that is in some way fragile or questionable, and we embark 
on the enterprise of history to make it clearer and more secure. In the process, of course, 
definitions may change a good deal, but the aim is to merge with some fuller sense of who we 
are. (Williams 2005b:23) 
An identity develops because by encountering the strangeness of the past “we are set free 
from the crippling imprisonment of what we can grasp and take for granted, the ultimate 
trivialising of our identity” (24). Openness to what we don’t fully understand is key. Good 
historical writing, according to Williams, deals with who we are by engaging with the 
strangeness of the past; it is different from us, and part of us. Bad history avoids the difficulty 
either by making the past a poor version of the present (making the different the same), or by 
defining it as incomprehensible and out of reach (the other as closed off from us). 
 For Williams history is instrumental in the formation of identity, and it has this role as 
long as it is not made into more of the same. He advocates, quite successfully, that openness 
and conflict is necessary for good historical writing to take place. This means that when 
dealing with historical sources they must be allowed to have their say, even if that means 
disrupting the current identity forming myth. For the sake of this paper it is expected that 
when Williams deals with the Arian Heresy he will not be afraid to open the story up, and to 
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make it strange. Arius will not be the hero, per se, but Williams’ ideal of keeping the narrative 
open will take centre stage. 
2.3 Identity 
 As has become apparent, Williams connects history to identity. What has not yet been 
so apparent is where this identity originates. In anticipation of what is to come later, in 
chapter 6, the critique of Lindbeck and postliberalism is just this; that the system has no 
origin. It is just there, and thus it is impossible to critically assess its formation. Williams 
differs in that he has a distinct origin for the system. In the introduction to his book why study 
the past? he makes three points: 
(a) History is a set of stories we tell in order to understand better who we are and the world 
we’re now in… (b) For someone trying to write the history of the Church as a Christian 
believer, the challenge is to trace the ways in which the Church has demonstrated it’s divine 
origin… (c) The Christian believes that Christian past and present (and future for that matter) 
are all bound up together in the Body of Christ. […] There will be an element of expectation: 
we shall emerge from the study of the past with some greater fullness of Christian maturity 
(Williams 2005b:1-3) (edited, and italics, by me) 
Identity is formed through the story we live by; a Christian identity is connected to a Christian 
history. This history has a starting point: a divine origin. This origin makes it possible to 
speak of body of Christ, and it is this body that is meant to grow into greater maturity. 
Something came in, a fundamental - a given. Without this given there would be no event to 
make sense of, and thus no identity forming myth – no history to tell us how this identity has 
been expressed.  
I mean by ’a given’ something that has the character of being presented to us as a gift. 
It comes to the recipient from outside him - although he is unable to se it coming, or from 
whence it came. The gift presented does not appear to be a gift, but the recipient still has 
something he did not have before the encounter. Something he was not, or had not, came to 
him and made him have more, be more. He now is something new. This new ‘is’ is ‘the 
given’; that which is taken for granted; the source from whence a sense of identity flows. 
Now, seeing as there is this group seeking an identity, and that this group do claim a history, 
it follows that this group deals with history, and the event, with a specific agenda: it should 
help bring greater clarity as to who they are and should become. 
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In what was stated above, the importance of openness became apparent. Williams 
demonstrates the connection between openness and the formation of identity by bringing 
attention to the need amongst the early Christians for new self-defining words. Identity is 
defined by what it is not, and so are words: it is ‘this’, not ‘that’. That means that a change in 
identity will also result in a change in the language one uses about oneself. Williams focuses 
upon three new words used when they talk about themselves: They were hagioi: a holy and 
sacred people. Their group is called ekklesiai, ‘civic assemblies’. And they describe 
themselves as paroikoi or paroikountes, ‘resident aliens’ or ‘settled migrants’ (Williams 
2005b:33). In these terms lies the notion that the Christians are not primarily answerable to 
the rulers of society, but that they, first and foremost, have to answer to God. 
 This focus on the church as an assembly of people set aside from what can 
offhandedly be called this world deserves emphasis. There was in the early church a primary 
motivator – a factor that made talk about a new identity as a Christian meaningful. They were 
no longer residents on this earth, but had been ‘teleported’ to heaven. This is why martyrdom 
was such an ideal. They testified in blood the allegiance to this new kingdom they now were 
citizens of. As Williams goes on to say:  
Out of this matrix (the allegiance to the divine, and the identity of being a conduit of divine 
presence) the debates about doctrine arise. Once again, we misunderstand the early Church if 
we suppose that these debates were fuelled by a general concern for verbal precision or by 
intellectual interests alone. The controversies about Christ in the fourth and fifth centuries are 
in their own way debates about what it is to be citizens of that city whose supreme court is that 
of the Divine Word […]. Doctrine, in this environment, is profoundly to do with the actual 
possibilities of the alien citizenship we have been examining. (Williams 2005b:40) 
The formation of early doctrine has, according to Williams, a deeply practical aspect: How 
can we make sense of our identity as alien to this world, and what role did Christ play in this? 
The fourth century theological debate had, from this point of view, as much to do with 
defining an identity as it had to do with ‘talking truthfully about God’ – for the sake of truth 
as a virtue. 
 The fourth century is perhaps the climactic point for Christianity’s attempt, with 
Williams’ words, “to put Humpty-Dumpty together again” (Williams 2005b:41). The Christ 
event had also been a chaos event, and it became important to re-establish order in the 
universe. There was a need for one story, one system, that didn’t divide God the creator from 
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God the redeemer. The church was faced with several paradoxical issues regarding God and 
Jesus that it had to make sense of “in the light of specific practices of worship and corporate 
behaviour” (42). Williams emphasizes this last sentence, which again reveals his focus on the 
practical aspect of the process leading up to the formation of doctrine. This process takes on a 
dialectical shape, of hypothesis followed by critique. Williams exemplifies this by the issues 
surrounding the divinity of Jesus: As some form of angelic power he fits neatly into the 
cosmology of both Greek and Jewish belief, but leaves open the question if it is God’s power 
we’re dealing with (43). At the beginning of the fourth century one of the best attempts to 
settle the issue is presented. It sparks a violent reaction that will shape the church for all 
posterity. The man responsible was an Alexandrian priest whose name would become 
synonymous with heresy: Arius. 
2.4 Intention 
 Williams presents his theological intention in the introduction to his systematic 
theological work, On Christian Theology (2000). Here he states that he regards theology as a 
communicative enterprise; it’s supposed to speak to those who are addressed by it regardless 
of their cultural environment. That being said, Williams does not by that say that it should 
communicate by being more of the same. Its power to communicate, to teach, to mature, is 
found in its strangeness. This is connected to a celebratory view of theology, where the 
intention is to reveal the vision, the flavour and the substance of what theology is trying to 
describe. This description might take the form of critical theology. Williams presents critical 
theology as an enterprise that tries to answer if what is emerging is actually the same as what 
was originally believed – or at least in line with (2000:xv). This ties in with history, which is 
what the theologian use for data, and identity. Williams says in Why study the past that we 
must “allow critical scholarship to suspect and turn inside out what is before us, to do its 
worst; but we cannot lost sight of the fact that, if this history is indeed ours, to examine it is to 
examine our own identity (2005b:102). The greatest danger to this examination of own 
identity is closing theology off by regarding one notion as the true paradigm. By holding one 
paradigm to be the truth, one in the same instance closes off oneself from history, thus one is 
no longer able to grow.  
 Rowan Williams’ theological intention, when dealing with history, is to have history 
provoke the mind into change. This process of change is key. We must recognize that we are 
part of this continual process, or as he himself says it: 
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Our minds engage with what is other… We acquire not so much a confidence in our solutions 
as a capacity to continue, a trust in the process. [One needs to engage with the past, because] 
to engage with the Church’s past is to see something of the Church’s future. If we relate to the 
past as something that settles everything for us, […] it is to treat the text of the past as closing 
off history. […] If we dismiss the past as unintelligible, […] we refuse to see how we have 
ourselves been formed from history; we pretend that history has not yet begun. And in the 
specifically theological contest, we shall on either count be denying that we can only grow in 
company, can only develop because summoned by a word that is not ours. That the word is 
made concrete and immediate for us in the human responses that have constituted the 
Church’s history; all of this has made our present believing selves possible. (Williams 
2005b:90+94) 
The reason it even makes sense to talk about an us is because there have been those who have 
gone before us, and to whom we are in debt. Our lives, our understanding of religion, are 
based on their lives, and how they understood it. Something outside of us came to us, and our 
response to this encounter is recorded as history. Again Williams shows his strong conviction 
that history must be purposeful: We wrestle with the rights and wrongs of those who have 
gone before us in order to reach a greater sense of maturity. Examples of this, drawn from the 
church’s past, can be how the church viewed slavery and women’s rights. We can learn from 
them, and become better, more mature, because of them. We can interact with what has been, 
to become more than what was; like with Aquinas, Barth and Kierkegaard – we are not them, 
because of them (Williams 2005b:98). The past makes us who we are, but also holds promise 
of who we one day shall become, as stated above; “we shall emerge from the study of the past 
with some greater fullness of Christian maturity”. 
To Williams the identity of the church is an evolving identity; all was not said that 
needed to be said in the event itself. There is more to the event than what has been uncovered 
thus far. It progresses towards something. The openness, and the process, is so imperative to 
Williams because it is part of his soteriology, as will soon be revealed. If so, the question 
begging to be asked is if Williams' views are connected to his position in the Anglican 
Church? Is this thesis trying to tackle a concern that is primarily Anglican in nature, and will 
the result of this thesis be primarily of interest to this community? To answer this, this thesis 
will look briefly at his position within the Anglican tradition. 
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2.5 Anglican Tradition 
 Rowan Williams is now the Archbishop of Canterbury, and he holds this position 
because his views were deemed appropriate for this office. He was ordained priest in 1978, 
while writing Arius in 1987, so he already had a long standing with the Anglican Church at 
the time of publication. Is this something that has influenced Williams to the degree that his 
concerns are of an Anglican nature? To answer this question a presentation of the role of 
tradition in the Anglican Church might be helpful - which immediately leads to one problem: 
What does Anglican mean? For instance, when trying to answer, “what is this strange world-
wide body called the Anglican Communion?” author Stephen Neill concludes by saying that 
there is no particular Anglican theology (Neill 1977:7+417). The Anglican Church is really 
the Catholic Church of Britain. However, when former bishop of London, J. W. C. Wand, 
deals with this issue he presents Anglican theology as an attempt to reconcile Roman Catholic 
and Evangelical teachings. Anglicanism believes that they are two aspects of the same 
platform (Wand 1972:26). Douglas J. Davies, when attempting to account for an Anglican 
Soteriology faces many of these difficulties, and others, like the party tension within the 
Anglicanism. He tries to account for the development of the church, and its view of salvation, 
before concluding with: “Times change, and so may the ethos of a church” (Davies 2005). 
While the limitations of this thesis do not allow for a complete investigation into Anglican 
theology, it is interesting to note how there is an acute awareness of an actual development 
taking place. This reflects what has been presented above. 
 One who does advocate a distinct Anglican theology is Rowan Williams. In his book 
Anglican Identities he writes: “it is not true that there is no distinctive Anglican doctrine. But 
the discovery of it may require some patience in reading and attending to a number of 
historical strands, in order to watch the way in which distinctiveness shows itself” (Williams 
2003:1). This is what he attempts in this book, even though he is tempted to add that ‘the 
Anglican tradition is tantalisingly hard to pigeonhole” (page 55). What is of interest to this 
thesis is found in the chapter dealing with an Anglican approach to st. Johns gospel, where 
several of the aspects already touched upon in this thesis are brought to light. History must be 
seen as ‘an other’ to us because “our selfhood is made real in the face of the other – a divine 
other […]” (Williams 2003:136). Mike Higton builds upon this when presenting Williams in 
Difficult gospel, and he says that although we receive identity by encountering an-other, we 
are in jeopardy of loosing ourselves in the process by being overtaken by their interests. If we 
are to be free we need to receive ourselves from God. He needs to be our ultimate 
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conversation partner, and he does this by means of Bible, tradition and each other (Higton 
2004:101). The evolving identity of the church mentioned above, and the goal of the process, 
is the believers growth into life – the process of learning the truth about oneself. Williams’ 
soteriology is connected to growth, based on an event. When Williams himself comments on 
atonement, he tries to avoid using the word ‘forgiveness’ and instead opts for ‘new creation’ 
and ‘relationship’ (2008). There is thus, with Williams, and the Anglican Church a distinct 
emphasis on the process in terms of salvation – though not necessarily equating the two. 
 Are, then, the concerns presented of an Anglican nature? It seems that by presenting 
Williams I in essence address a denominational challenge. As is evident, Williams is closely 
linked to Anglicanism, if not by position as head of the Anglican Church, than in sympathies 
to the importance of process and development. However, I would argue, it might just as well 
be that as an open and developmental oriented denomination, they are more adapt to address 
some concerns of a universal nature. Williams’ view of tradition as conversation partner, for 
instance, is not a result of his Anglican background, per se. It does not take on the form of 
‘Sacred Tradition’. Tradition is viewed historically, and not as an authority. Williams does 
have distinct Anglican elements, like the importance of interpreting the Christ event within 
the community of the church, however the issues and concerns presented in this thesis are not 
of an Anglican nature. Rather, Williams is trying to meet challenges presented to ‘The 
Church’, which include the Anglican. These challenges are related to doctrinal theology – 
namely hermeneutics and doctrine, as well as historicism and doctrine. 
2.6 Doctrine 
Now that Williams hermeneutical presuppositions regarding history has been 
presented, it is time to look closer at how he views doctrines. The first step in this will be 
taken by investigating his methodological starting point. He presents his methodology, before 
presenting his theological essays, in On Christian Theology. He begins by stating that a 
theologian will begin by talking about what is already there – the common life and practice 
that make up the word God. When the actions of the church interfere with the image of God it 
is meant to portray, the theologian is the one who is supposed to straighten it all out. This 
cleaning process is painful, because by cleaning – by giving it a new language – you 
inevitable loose something in the process (Williams 2000:xii). Theology as an organized 
entity is thus created out of a heterogeneous pool of practices that try to embody the word 
God by relating to the content of that word. 
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When Jeffrey McCurry makes his case for a move “towards a poetics of theological 
creativity” he uses Rowan Williams reading of Augustine’s de doctrina in light of Derrida as 
a case study (McCurry 2007). By so doing he also reveals some key aspects on how Williams 
views doctrine. He states that a good metaphor to understand Williams can be that of a script 
to a play. The meaning in text of scripture, creed and tradition might be reinterpreted in much 
the same way as Shakespeare might be reinterpreted. The play can be true to its words 
without being equated with the original authors intention. An example, parallel to that of 
McCurry, can be found in the movie Romeo and Juliet from 1996, where guns replaced 
swords, while at the same time preserving the language, and hopefully the message, of the 
play. McCurry uses the phrase “texts unlimited” to describe this view of dealing with the 
sources. The “text” is never exhausted because there is always a possibility for the present 
world to be written into the text. This is not to say that it is devoid of content – you cannot 
have Romeo use the words of Prince Hamlet and still call it Romeo and Juliet. It is possible to 
respect the otherness of the text at the same time as they are inflected into new situations. This 
is what McCurry calls “poetics of theological creativity” (McCurry 2007: 415-417). He then 
goes on to verbalise some of the aspects mentioned above, like how we are what we are 
because of those who went before us – we read with their glasses. McCurry demonstrates how 
Williams does this by showing how Derrida has influenced Williams’ reading of Augustine. I 
will not follow him on this trail, but the observant reader, who has prior knowledge of the 
topic, will already have noticed how Derrida has influenced Williams, and myself, by what 
has already been stated in the preceding paragraphs. 
 Once again, the importance of openness is presented. McCurry states that: “Williams 
warns against closure in reading scripture” (422). He then goes on to say that “the meaning of 
the Bible always remains difficult, […] and the meaning of the Bible is always different from 
the meaning we believe it to possess in the present moment” (423). This reflects Williams’ 
doctrine of the being of God as the complete other – and hence if we possessed the final 
meaning of scripture, we would also possess the final meaning of God. By reading the text 
with a new language we are again surprised by the text, at the same time as it is still the text 
speaking to us. This is theology within the context of the Church. 
Additional clues to Williams’ view of doctrines can be found in Geoffrey 
Wainwright’s review article in Scottish Journal of Theology (Wainwright 2003). Although the 
article is on specific doctrines as outlined by Williams in his on Christian Theology, it still 
has some helpful insights. Like how Wainwright is tempted to call this book “an open system 
 25 
of theology” (74). I’ll leapfrog over the critique Wainwright makes on Williams theology, and 
instead focus on his underlying concern. Wainwright is not at ease with Williams’ Abelardian 
view of atonement (80). It does, however, explain why maturing is so important for 
Williams’, and why doctrines must be viewed as tools to open up the message, by being 
spoken in a new language. With a moral influence view of the atonement it is not the intrinsic 
truth in the doctrine that is of greatest importance, but how this doctrine can help the Christian 
live the life Jesus exemplified – a relationship with the father. Wainwright also mentions why 
Williams points out “the need for a diachronic awareness of the factors that go into dogmatic 
decision” (81) – why Williams ties in time and history with doctrine. He describes the event 
as “the long-drawn out dogmatic crisis of the fourth century in the Christian Church” 
(Williams 2000:139); a quote that reveals yet again how Williams regards the formation of 
doctrine as a process – a process that has not ended. It has only begun, and to this beginning 
this thesis will now turn. 
2.7 Conclusion 
 Williams’ hermeneutical platform approaches history from a highly practical 
standpoint. History is the teacher that defines the pupil. By being different, being other, it 
provokes an opening of the ‘what is’ by facing it with ‘what isn’t’. In this way history is kept 
open, as well as opening up the viewer of history. This conflict, or this crisis, which ruptures 
the old, forces an act of mending to take place. The conflict is healed by writing history; a 
story that accounts for the event, written to confirm identity. Identity is derived from history, 
but also is the motive behind writing history. This circle is what keeps a person moving 
forward – maturing – growing in the relationship.  
 Doctrines, to Williams, are symbols to be interpreted. They do not contain truth as 
such, but they lead towards the truth. Truth cannot be contained in the symbols, because the 
symbols are a reflection of how the writers of the symbol tried to make sense of the event, 
based on their identity. The identity is not given, it is formed; it is a process. The Nicene crisis 
was an identity crisis, as well as a theological crisis. It was necessary to avoid further 
ruptures, so those who disrupted the new identity were considered heretics. 
 Williams’ hermeneutical platform is the result of contemporary concerns within the 
field of doctrinal theology – how to deal with truth claims considering their historic origin. 
This is what this thesis will continue to investigate: In what way can Rowan Williams’ 
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dealings with the Arian controversy, and the subsequent formation of the Christological 
doctrine, give greater understanding to the process surrounding the formation of doctrine? 
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Chapter 3: Arius the Conservative 
3.1 Introduction 
The intention of this chapter is to begin an investigation into factors Rowan Williams 
deem influential in the formation of the Christological doctrine. These factors will be based 
on what he writes in his book Arius – heresy and tradition (2005a). He divides this book into 
three sections: Arius and the Nicene Crisis, Arius and Theology, Arius and Philosophy. Based 
on this I have divided the influencing factors into three categories: Socio-political, 
theological, and philosophical issues. Of these the first two will be dealt with in this chapter, 
while the philosophical will be the topic for the following. Also, Williams presents the first 
two as position that can be seen as conservative Alexandrian, while the latter touches more on 
the essence of his controversy. And so I have called this chapter Arius the conservative, while 
the next is called Arius the radical. 
Regarding the socio-political influences, I will focus on how Williams presents 
concerns relating to the problems of authority in the church, and how this is related to a 
plurality in church views. There is not a ready-made church present, nor is there, in postliberal 
terms, a finished language. The idea of an ideal “Catholic church” over against a “heretical” 
one does not, according to Williams, hold up to closer scrutiny. There is a distinct need for an 
identity, and this identity develops as a result of a process. This again is, in part, what leads 
Williams to present the formation of the Christological doctrine as a process - as a result of 
conflict. How he substantiates this will be investigated more closely. 
Regarding the theological factors, I will focus on how Williams presents the theology 
of Arius as influenced by contemporary concerns. As stated in the last chapter, Williams will 
not present Arius as a hero, but he will present him as a serious conversation partner. The 
seriousness of Arius will be demonstrated by showing how he tried to deal with themes like 
Gods immutability, transcendence, unknowability and free will. These themes, part of the Via 
Negativa, were not only Arian concerns; how should one understand scriptural verses that 
emphasize the union between Father and Son, while other emphasized their individual 
distinction? The Christ event forced the need for a new way of explaining God; the Son 
needed to be incorporated into the divine economia. Soon the Son was the medium the Father 
used to connect with this tangible world. But how could this be? First of all there is only one 
God, so where does this place the Son? Is he a creation? If so, how can he reveal God, and, 
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even more so, be worshiped as God in the church? There is no room for multiple deities 
within a monotheistic framework. These are some of the question Arius, according to 
Williams, attempts to give a serious answer to. 
Regarding modern concerns, I will save those for a later chapter. When dealing with 
how events in the past were influenced by other events in the past, it is hard to avoid the 
concerns from historicism and the like. However, to avoid making this chapter too cluttered, I 
will address those concerns later, in chapter 5. How postliberalism, historicism, and pragmatic 
historicism relate to Rowan Williams will be dealt with at that point. The same goes for a 
debate into the uniqueness of how Williams presents Arius. This chapter will merely lay the 
foundation. 
3.2 Prologue 
What, then, is Williams’ methodology in dealing with the material? The essence of 
this has already been touched upon in the last chapter. However, this issue will be well served 
by further elaboration. Williams starts off his presentation of a suitable methodology by using 
an example from anthropology, more specific Johannes Fabian’s book Time and Other: How 
Anthropology Makes its Objects. The essential issue here is how the observer, or scholar, 
stands in what he believes is a ‘normative’ time – a place in time where all other events are 
judged – as opposed to ‘other’ time – the time where the object of study is found. “If Fabian is 
right, the creation and imposition of ‘normative’ time is a device for avoiding the 
relativization of one’s own position” (Williams 2005a:23). By this Williams is afraid of 
closing off history by making it irrelevant – removing its power to change us. Fabian goes on 
to say that it is not tradition and modernity that are opposed; it’s not same societies at 
different developmental stages, but different societies at the same time (23). What Williams is 
getting at here, by way of Fabian, is what was touched upon in the last chapter: how to make 
history open up our world so that we can mature. Envisioning a ‘normative’ time for the 
development of doctrine does not do this – nor does it help to label the ‘other’ time as an 
undeveloped form of ‘now’.  
We need to see how ‘Arian’ and ‘Catholic’ were coeval as Christians engaged in the definition 
of the very idea of normative faith, and to see how diffuse this struggle was and (often) how 
unclear its boundaries. We need to grasp how deeply Arius’ agenda […] entered into what was 
to become orthodoxy in the process of the controversy. And if this can to some extent be 
achieved, we shall be clearer about what in our supposedly straightforward doctrinal ‘present’ 
is owed, negatively an positively to Arius. (Williams 2005a:24) 
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The past needs to be taken seriously as a voice in its own right. It’s not an other in 
terms of simply being what we are not; it’s an other by confronting us with what we are. By 
understanding the complexity of how orthodox theology became orthodox, by borrowing 
terms and images from dissidents, we are faced with an understanding of the doctrinal process 
as just that; a process. As Williams states it, this “is to experience the orthodoxy as something 
still future… There is no absolute locus standi above the struggle… Orthodoxy continues to 
be made” (2005a:25). A sound methodology, according to Williams, when studying history 
of doctrine is then to deal with it as history: present the past as something that challenges the 
present, and do this by making sense of its strangeness. By reducing heresy to an undeveloped 
stage – or a distant point on the time line – one marks the heresy as an ‘other’ that is of no 
consequence to the present. It is separated from us, and by that is unable to influence us in any 
way. What is suggested is to allow the heresy to challenge us to avoid a sterile dialogue. It 
thus appear that doctrine is created out of conflict. 
3.3 Socio-political factors 
 Identity and Authority are, according to Williams, two major factors influencing the 
players leading up to the Nicene crisis. There is no homogenous entity called the church, per 
se, and the question of who has final authority in questions regarding faith is still unresolved. 
What there is, on the other hand, is tradition. There have been certain ways of dealing with 
these issues, but contemporary issues challenge these former methods. The church has to 
adapt to the situations in the first half of the fourth century, which is what will now be 
presented.  
3.3.1 Identity 
 The church that had to adapt to new set of circumstances was not a homogenous 
entity, according to Williams. The circumstances in question are Constantine’s victory, and 
the freedom this gave the church. Williams starts by presenting the persecution started by 
Diocletian in 303, which continued until Constantine assumed power in 313. This resulted in 
the imprisonment, or worse, of many bishops that would otherwise be overseeing their 
diocese. This created a need for ‘substitute bishops’ to perform the responsibilities of those 
otherwise incapacitated. On this stage Melitius enters, and, as many of his peers sees it, 
performs a coup d'etat (Williams 2005a:32-36). From this the two factors in question appear. 
The first is in regards to authority: Who has the right to perform the rite of baptism, the 
distribution of the sacraments, or to ordain new presbyters? And what do you do when there is 
no bishop available? In addition to questions of authority, there is also the question of 
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identity. Melitius was not the only dissident at the time (41). The persecution had made it 
even more difficult than normal to keep tabs on all the different fractions. 
 The idea of the church as a homogenous entity belongs to a post-Nicene vantage point. 
As Williams states: “The church of which Alexander became bishop in 313 does not seem to 
have been a particularly harmonious body” (2005a:41). It was possible for a group not far 
from Alexandria to implement traditions and teaching not all too congruent with the 
‘Catholic’ teaching. Even within Alexandria, whose bishop had the character of an 
archbishop, you would find distinct fractions.  
There never was, as Williams argues, an ‘Arian Church’ vis-à-vis a ‘Catholic Church.” 
The milieu in Alexandria consisted of a plurality of churches. One does not find the 
harmonious single entity called ‘the church’, but rather several distinct fractions. Williams 
presents several of these before stating: 
The plurality of churches in Alexandria suggests that the beginnings of Christianity in the city 
were piecemeal and various – no single primitive congregation under a catholic bishop. This 
picture is reinforced by such evidence as we have of the prevalence in and around the city of 
Gnostic influences and the survival in ‘respectable’ circles of extracanonical literature. 
(Williams 2005a:44)Williams 2005a:44) 
The plurality of churches makes it hard to define who is one ‘the inside’, and who is on ‘the 
outside’. As such it is hard to present Arius as one who is outside of what could be deemed 
the ‘Catholic church’. “’Arianism’ as a coherent system,” says Williams, “founded by a single 
great figure and sustained by his disciples, is a fantasy – more exactly a fantasy based on the 
polemic of Nicene writers, above all Athanasius” (2005a:82). Although there were many who 
were sympathetic to Arius’ cause, they did not pledge allegiance to a man. When Athanasius 
gives his four creeds at the council of Antioch in 341, he accounts for the events surrounding 
the Council, and so refers to a comment by the Arian sympathizers:  
We have not been followers of Arius, - how could Bishops, such as we, follow a Presbyter? -
nor did we receive any other faith beside that which has been handed down from the 
beginning. But, after taking on ourselves to examine and to verify his faith, we admitted him 
rather than followed him; as you will understand from our present avowals. (Maguire 2007) 
The identity and boundaries of a ‘Catholic’ church was not there before, as Williams points 
out (2005a:83). The identity of the church was not solidified, but rather in the process of 
being made, and Arius was part of this process. 
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 The difficulty of portraying Arius as the leader of a dissenter fraction challenging ‘the 
true church’ can be illustrated by an example. Williams describes the process and turmoil 
leading up to Arius’ death in 336. During an array of complicated events, including several 
synods, Constantine's sick sister, and an impromptus comment on the emperors mother, Arius 
was invited to present himself before the regent in November of 327 (Williams 2005a:74). 
The result of this meeting was a letter reinstating Arius and a following synod, held by 
Eusebius, confirming his restoration. This is where Athanasius makes a stand, against 
Constantine and Eusebius. Having Alexandria closed off for him, Arius writes a letter to 
Constantine, resulting in his own condemnation (77). He is later welcomed to present his 
case, which he does successfully, and so is again in good standing with the emperor in 335. 
What reverts the situation back in Athanasius favour is Arius’ untimely death about a year 
later (being “smitten by God” can easily turn advocates into adversaries)4
3.3.2  Authority 
 (81). This means 
that the ‘Catholic’ church and the ‘Arian’ church both were regarded as the official church of 
the empire at different times. The struggle between the two was really a struggle of identity, 
and this identity was related to questions of authority. 
When Williams presents the problem of authority in the church, he presents two 
fractions: those who believe that the bishop has the final say, and those who believe in the 
authority of the inspired teacher. The melitian schism, presented above, also begged the 
question of who has authority over the teachings of the church. As presented, there were 
different fractions at the time, with a diverse set of ideas (Williams 2005a:41). Who could 
decide if these ideas were harmonious with the church teaching or not? Alexander, bishop 
from 313-328, tried to “consolidate the church around the bishop” (45). Opposing him - 
rejecting the bishop’s authority - is Arius, who himself is a presbyter. “The beginnings of 
Arianism lie, as much as anything, in the struggles of the Alexandrian episcopate to control 
and unify a spectacularly fissiparous Christian body” (2005a:46). The presbyters were 
members of a collegiate body (44), and they had a tradition of opposing bishops running back 
to the time of Origen. 
 To resolve conflict between a teacher and a bishop, it was for Origen important to look 
at the spirituality aspect. Williams relates how ordo in the church was for Origen a spiritual 
issue (2005a:83). Institutional authority and spiritual stature are interconnected; a spiritual 
                                                             
4 Arius is said to die while occupying a public lavatory as a result of fervent intersession on the side of his 
adversaries. (Williams 2005:81) 
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man with low rank trumps a higher-ranking clergy who might be thought of as less spiritual. 
Rank can be the result of ambition. The teacher has to rely on his own authority when 
accosted by an unspiritual cleric. As Williams goes on to say, “Episcopal authority had 
emerged originally as something closely bound up with the role of the charismatic teacher…” 
(84). On the flip side of this, there was also the question of who could correct a teacher if he 
began to stray too far off in his teaching. In Alexandria this problem became a major one. The 
presbyter was licensed to expound scripture, much like a bishop; he even belonged to a group 
who consecrated the bishop. He had his authority in his own right, and not dependent upon 
another. Alexander threatens Origens view of parallel hierarchies by making the presbyter 
answerable to the bishop. This is what Arius opposes, and it also explains why Eusebius and 
others support Arius; they revered the tradition of the ‘school’ and its teachers – like Origen 
(85). Eusebius supports Arius because of his conviction that the church is kept going by the 
succession of faithful teachers. He is a little apprehensive of bishops when they are not 
associated with true teachers (2005b:14). Arius conflict with Alexander is thus a conflict of 
tradition. 
One difference between the time of Origen and that of Arius was that by the start of 
the fourth century it became increasingly important with a unified and harmonious church. 
Williams comments on this, and says that Constantine in essence resolved this struggle 
between a ‘Catholic and Academic’ approach. His newfound empire needed stability and 
unity, for obvious reasons. This also applied for the church. “The Church’s new ‘visibility’ 
meant that the wrong sort of Christian group was regarded pretty much as the Church itself 
had been regarded by the pagan empire, as something subversive of the sacred character of 
social life” (2005a:90). There was a major shift in authority leading up to the council of 
Nicaea. This shift plays a big role in the need for a unanimous support at the council; it results 
in a black or white rhetoric: ‘you are either with us, or against us.’  
The process leading up to the council of Nicaea is marked by conflicts of authority. 
There is a tradition for a dual understanding of authority: spiritual and institutional - a 
monarchical episcopal authority over against the presbyterial college. As this evolves there is 
an increased polarization, with the teacher and the ‘schools’ on one side, and the bishop and 
the ‘Catholic’ on the other. Parallel with this polarization there is also a move from a plurality 
of churches – tied in with the authority of the teacher – to an increased attention to 
harmonization. There is in essence no defined ‘Catholic’ identity. What is to become 
‘Catholic’ is a hierarchal power structure with a God ordained individual on top, his bishops, 
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and then the presbyters. The content of ‘Catholic’ varies according to what the ruler has 
deemed correct – whether it be Arius or Athanasius.  
3.4 Theology  
 Piecing together a theology of Arius is not an easy undertaking. The foremost problem 
is lack of sources that can be attributed to Arius with any confidence. As Williams says: “we 
have only a handful of texts that can confidently be treated as giving Arius’ own thinking in 
his own records; apart from these we are wholly dependent upon the reports of his enemies” 
(2005a:95). To uncover a theology of Arius one needs to approach it by way of literary- and 
source criticism. This thesis will not follow Williams in this undertaking, but rather focus on 
what Williams presents as a proposition to a theology of Arius.  
 The theology of Arius, according to Williams, revolves around one key element: the 
freedom of God (2005a:98). Because of His free will, God chose to have a Son – to create ex 
nihilo according to his own free will. Because God’s will cannot be restricted, he must pre-
exist the son. If not the Son is self-subsistent, but  “God alone is anarchos, and the Son has an 
arche” (97). But if the Son is created as separate from God, how then can he know God in any 
meaningful sense? If the Son is a creature – the same as other creatures (what other kind is 
there?) – how can he reveal anything about God? Does ‘the Revealer’ need revelation? How 
about self-revelation? If Jesus is the image of the father, then he should have complete access 
to that image. Williams propose that the best reading of Arius leads to the bestowal of some 
sort of participation in the divine intellect (106). The Son is exalted, but not because of virtue; 
he is exalted from the beginning because of his love of righteousness. The Father knows he 
will always be worthy of this, and so he gives from what is his; a transfiguring grace. Seeing 
as God is a self-revealing being, he reveals what he can within the limits of the 
creature/creator difference. Still, if God bestows revelation, or grace, on the Son, does this 
mean that the Son is exalted into sonship? This again reverts back to will, and it seems that 
Arius argued for a pre-incarnate voluntary love of righteousness, and contemplation on the 
praise of God (114). The unique sonship of the Logos is a result of his endless love of 
righteousness and not to be taken literally. He is a product of Gods will, a metaphor, and his 
position is a result of God’s will (109). 
 The controversy was one of biblical hermeneutics. From what Williams says “Arius 
presented himself as essentially a biblical theologian” (2005a:107). The controversy actually 
started as a scriptural dispute. For Arius the ‘Son’ is a metaphor for the second hypostasis – 
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drawing upon other sonship sayings in scripture that is not directed to ‘the Son’ (Is 1:2, Deut 
32:18, Job 38:28). The problem for Arius is that his teaching goes against the practice of the 
church. Athanasius advocates Lex orandi lex interpretandi, while Arius adheres to a belief in 
the authority of the teacher to reinterpret the practices of the church. This is the ‘catholic’ 
versus ‘academic’ tradition already addressed. This leads Williams to state that “Those who 
have insisted that the Arian controversy is essentially about hermeneutics are right…” 
(Williams 2005a:108). Both sides of the controversy tried to make sense of the scriptural 
material along with the praxis of the church. Add to that some fundamental theological 
concerns, like the immutability and free will of God, and you have set the stage for conflict. 
Being slightly reductive, you can say that the conflict revolves around one specific way of 
interpreting the material; one key notion that must be given the right of way when making 
sense of it all. Arius’ hermeneutical key was the teaching of God’s unique and immaterial 
nature. “All that is said about the begetting of the Son must be interpreted in the light of this 
central belief (Williams 2005a:111). This point is of central importance to this thesis. Behind 
the language, before the doctrine, there is a hermeneutical key. 
3.4.1 Theological influences 
 Arius was not an original theologian, per se. The church had a longstanding tradition 
of dealing with certain issues relating to the freedom of God, the inaccessibility of God, and 
the hypostasis of God – issues of importance for Arius. Williams presents Arius as a 
“committed theological conservative; more specifically, a conservative Alexandrian” 
(2005a:175). His role as a conservative Alexandrian was the result of dealing with theological 
issues derived from his Jewish and Christian predecessors. The source for his ideas can be 
better understood by looking at his intellectual context. “It might be said,” according to 
Williams, “that there were tensions and loose ends enough in third-century theology to make 
it predictable that the fourth would produce some sort of doctrinal crisis (2005a:178). Some of 
these tensions will now be brought to attention. 
3.4.1.1 Philo 
 Arius’ attempt to make sense of conflicting notions between the freedom of God, and 
his position as the creator of a rationally ordered universe, can be led back to Philo of 
Alexandria (20 BC – 50 AD). Philo designated the creation of the world of ideas to God; 
nothing outside God has any role in creation – or any motive in so doing. God did not create 
the world as a manifestation of the kosmos noetos; “the kosmos noetos is the ‘shadow’ image 
of God, reflecting what is eternally in him, not the product of an arbitrary act of will 
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unrelated to the divine nature” (Williams 2005a:118). God created the world of ideas by 
choice, while at the same time having this creation reflect him and his reason. This world of 
ideas and reason is what Philo identifies with the Logos.  
The Logos is again what makes a transcendent God accessible to the nous. Creation 
only has access to God through the Logos; he is what he is in virtue of being that which we 
can begin to know God; the mediating principle, the instrument of grace. He offers knowledge 
of God, and participation in his gifts. “It is God himself turned towards what is not God” 
(Williams 2005a:119). Philo presents the Logos as boundary between God and creation; he is 
not agenetos nor genetos. This means that to be ‘in’ the Logos is almost like being in a 
mystical union with God, but with the exception that it is not really God one is in union with. 
Rather, one is now in a position to grasp the incomprehensibility of God. As the astute reader 
might have picked up on by now, the theology of Philo is by and large affected by Hellenistic 
philosophy. As presented above, his ties with Platonism is made apparent. In addition 
Williams mentions how he “seem to share the Neopythagorean distinction between two kinds 
primal unity; […] the unity of transcendence and self-subsistence, and the unity of all things 
in ultimate rational harmony, the reducibility of things to formal dependence upon a single 
principle” (121). Arius’ emphasis on the immutability and free will of God is closely 
connected with Philo’s dealing with the different levels of cosmic unity in Parmenides and 
from the Neopythagoreans. 
 Arius and Philo shared three concerns. First the insistence on divine freedom; the 
mind had to be raised up by God to God. Second, The Logos is a mediator of God’s gifts. 
Third, knowing God by his gifts is not the same as knowing God as he truly is (Williams 
2005a:122). While Arius might not have been a student of Philo, he did find himself 
immersed in a tradition which had two modes of saving knowledge; by the stripping away of 
the illusions, or by God’s self revelation. There is a paradox already present, affecting Arius; 
the way God becomes known both is and is not God – to complicate this further this 
instrument that both is and is not God is given an identity. He is not genetos, nor agenetos. 
Not temporal, nor eternal; part of the divine life, yet existing for the sake of creation – theos 
but not ho theos (124). Trying to make sense of these contradictions created by inserting a 
person into the equation is Arius’ theological agenda. 
 By presenting Philos influence on Arius, Williams also presents Arius as a theological 
conservative. He is attempting to tie up already underlying concerns. His theology is not ‘the 
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other’ to an established church, but a result of dealing with questions already present in the 
church. This will become more apparent as this thesis proceeds to deal with Clement of 
Alexandria and Origen. 
3.4.1.2  Clement 
Clement of Alexandria influenced Arius by the way he stresses the inaccessibility of God. 
The transcendent is removed from the immanent by its very nature. He can draw near to us, 
but it is a one-way street. The only way for gennetos to acquire a notion of the agennetos is 
through the Logos. He is the teacher (didaskalos) of wisdom – even more so; he is Wisdom. 
Williams goes on to quote a beautiful section of Clement’s Protreptikos: 
I [the high priest] long, I long to endow you with this grace, granting you the blessed heritage 
of immortality; and I freely give you reason (logos), knowledge of God, I freely give you what 
I myself perfectly am. This is what I am, this is what God wills, this is sumphonia, this is the 
harmonia of the Father, this Son, this Christ, this Word of God, the arm of the Lord, the power 
of all things, the Father’s will. For all you who are images (eikones) yet not all true likenesses 
(emphereis), my wish is to bring you to your right form, to the archetype, so that you too may 
become like me. (2005a:125) 
The Son gives knowledge, because he is knowledge – a transforming knowledge (gnosis). 
There is a difference between knowing God, and seeing the Logos. It is the Logos that is 
knowable - the eikon of God. The Father is still beyond the grasp of man – beyond the monas. 
Whether the Logos is a subsistent being or not is not an intelligible question, because we 
cannot help seeing the Logos as distinct from ‘that which we cannot grasp’. How we are to 
know God’s essence, through the Logos, while at the same time being unable to know the 
essence of God – the difference between first and second principle – is problematic. And this 
again leads up to some of what Arius is trying to resolve. 
Arius is connected with Clement – as can be seen in the formers use of the latter’s 
vocabulary (130) – and finds himself both in a tradition that emphasise the free will of the 
Father (chose to reveal himself), and an ‘academic’ form of Christianity. The influence might 
be predominantly about an ethos about an unseen, indescribable God, and a refusal to corrupt 
this by “the admission into the divine substance of a second principle, with its implications of 
a continuous scala naturae from the world to God” (Williams 2005a:131). Arius is not 
willing to corrupt God’s self-subsistence by incorporating emanation into the godhead. The 
Son is not an accident of the Father, nor is he a result of God being Father. There is nothing 
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automatic in the Son coming into being. The Son, the Logos, the eikon is the result of God’s 
will. 
3.4.1.3 Origen 
Origen was another major influence on Arius. He advocated two hypostasis in God: 
“Father and Son are ‘two things (pragmata) in subsistence (hypostasis), but are one in 
likemindedness, harmony (sumphonia) and identity of will” (Williams 2005a:132). They are 
separate in more than just names; they have separate ousia – which also applies to the Spirit. 
They are numerically different, while still one in will. The Son receives all that he is from the 
Father and has kinship with the Father. He is thus worthy of the title theos – though using ho 
theos might be straining it. Origen turns to emanation metaphors in order to resolve this 
apparent contradiction between sameness and difference: the Son is the breath of the power of 
God, not of God himself. Their relation is like that of the will and the mind. Still it is 
emphasized that the Son is not generated out of the Father’s ousia. God has no corporeality, 
no defining characteristics. He is immaterial and indivisible. The Father timelessly generated 
the Son; the word does not have an arche in time, just in origin. Seeing as God is 
unchangeable, he must always have been what he is: a Father. They are consubstantial not in 
materiality, but by doing what God does - operation, not essence. As with Philo and Clement: 
the Logos is how God is revealed to us (137). Still, there is no automatic creation. God first 
wills – even if this point is a bit ambiguous in Origen – and this is what the Son reveals. 
Arius view of Son as separate from Father can be linked to Origen. That is not to say 
that they see eye to eye on the theological conclusions. Williams states that: 
Arius stands in the tradition of Origen in so far as he holds to the transcendence of the Father, 
the impossibility of believing in two co-ordinate agenn(n)eta, self-sufficient first principles, 
and the substantive and distinct reality of three divine hupostais or ousia; and he probably has 
Origen on his side in repudiating the homoousios and the idea that the Son is ‘out of’ the 
Father’s substance. (Williams 2005a:143) 
Arius goes further than Origen in terms of the consequences of these notions: God is un-
reachable; he is one alone; the other divine substances are derived from this one. From this 
Arius emphasizes the separation of Father and Son. While Origen is adamant regarding the 
persona of the Son, he does not believe there can be any meaningful objectification of him 
apart from his relationship with the Father. “He is the soil on which we grow, the eyes with 
which we see” (144). Origen does not come to the same conclusion as Arius. They differ, for 
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one, on issues like the eternity of the Son. The legacy of Origen is not on the theological 
doctrines, per se, but on how one is to substantiate the doctrines in question. “It might be 
more accurate to see Origen’s legacy to Arius in relation to exegetical method (148)” It’s a 
question of methodology. 
 Origen, as well as Clement, is representative for a tradition that strongly emphasizes 
exegesis. Origen’s theological standpoint came from exegeting the scriptures - even the 
conflicting ones (especially the conflicting ones). He attempted to harmonize passages that 
describe the superiority of the Father, while at the same time doing justice to the language of 
oneness. As stated above, the Arian conflict is really a conflict over hermeneutics – how to 
make sense of the material in the scripture while also trying to take seriously some key 
philosophical concerns regarding God. Origen is trying to rationally interpret the bible, at the 
same time as defending it’s claim of divine inspiration. Arius does not represent an ‘Origenist 
school’ in terms of theology; he does so in terms of methodology. He is, as Williams states, 
an “exponent of ‘learned’, rationally coherent, catechesis […] reflecting the ideology of the 
charismatic teacher and his circle of initiates” (148). In this respect, Arius is not a radical, but 
a conservative. 
3.4.2 Summary 
 Williams portray Arius as one who is set on resolving longstanding conflicting notions 
already present within the church’s tradition. To resolve these conflicting notions he uses a 
methodology that has a longstanding history in Alexandria. This leads Williams to state that 
“Arius was a committed theological conservative; more specifically, a conservative 
Alexandrian” (2005a:175). His apophaticism and his interpretation of how the eternal can 
communicate with the contingent are not new. Neither is his emphasis on illumination, the 
inspired gnosis, or the charismatic teaching tradition. He believes in the unknowability of the 
Father; a Word voluntarily produced by this Father to mirror and manifest his glory. This 
Word is a distinct spiritual individual. God creates this word, not out of necessity, but out of 
choice. Even if Arius’ theology might be labelled heretic – although it is not within the scope 
of this thesis to make judgements on this – he has his feet on solid ground when performing it.  
 Williams shows how Arius was a theological conservative by showing how there is 
little in his theology that is new. He is radical in that he structures these traditional ideas in 
new ways, and reaches new conclusions: “God is free, the world need not exist, the Word is 
other than God, the Word is part of the world, so the Word has been formed ex nihilo” 
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(Williams 2005a:177). To substantiate these claims, Arius had to present them from an 
exegetical standpoint. He has to demonstrate hermeneutical priority in terms of certain text, 
and he does this by showing the flexibility of the sonship language. While he might have been 
a diligent exegete, his starting point was not exegetical (178). There were other concerns 
taking precedence over his exegesis, thus influencing it. It is this notion of primal influence, a 
hermeneutical key, which this thesis will continue to develop. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Williams proposes that to understand Arius - the conflict and the theology – one has to 
investigate the underlying factors. This chapter has looked closer at how Williams presents 
two of these: social-political factors, and theological. By investigating the socio-political, 
Williams demonstrated how the conflict was not a conflict between a ‘Catholic’ versus a 
‘Heretic’ church. There is a distinct vacuum of defined identities at the time. What is to be 
‘Catholic’ is still open, and it is influenced by the imperial will. The ‘heretic’ Arius is not the 
leader of an Arian fraction, but he stands in a tradition emphasizing the role of the inspired 
teacher. Williams, in addition to demonstrating the problem of identity, also shows how the 
conflict is one regarding authority: Who has the right to make judgements regarding the 
representative teachings of the church? Added to this question is the new setting, where 
Christianity now is the imperial faith, and thus it is important that the religion supports the 
peace. There is no room for disturbing elements, and those who oppose are deemed heretical. 
And so, when Arius opposes Alexander, and when he attempts to move power in the direction 
of the bishops, he is ostracized.  
By investigating the theological factors, Williams demonstrated how Arius was a 
‘conservative Alexandrian’. His theology, and his methodology, had a longstanding tradition 
in Alexandria. Williams demonstrates this tradition by presenting, among other, Philo, 
Clement and Origen. It is by this presentation evident that Arius attempts to deal with what he 
sees as unresolved issues in the understanding of the Divine relationship. The freedom and 
inaccessibility of God influences his scriptural hermeneutics, and he proves his point by 
exegesis of certain biblical passages. This is the tradition of Origen. 
 Williams has by his presentation made his case stronger for the need to look at 
doctrines from a historicist standpoint. Exactly what this means will be dealt with in chapter 
5. What can be stated at this point is that Williams’ presentation of doctrines as the result of a 
process – a process still taking place – appears well founded.  
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Chapter 4: Arius the Radical 
4.1 Introduction 
While the last chapter portrayed Arius as a theological conservative, it is now time to 
investigate into what made him controversial – according to Rowan Williams. This 
controversial aspect, this originality, is what I call the radicalness of Arius – a term Williams 
also use, though perhaps more sparingly, and perhaps with a greater emphasis on disjunction. 
In both cases it is used to describe what is very different from the traditional. (Merriam-
Webster) William states that Arius became controversial because he fused conservative 
elements with “a very un-conservative ontology […]” (Williams 2005a:232). Williams thus 
attributes the radicalness of Arius to his philosophical influences. Still, Williams is careful not 
to portray Arius as a philosopher who tried to make theology fit his philosophical mould 
(230). What he does do is make use of a language already present in order to make sense of 
the Christ event, and the revelation it is said to contain. Arius had a theological agenda: he 
understood the Christian doctrine of creation in metaphysical terms (231). The same goes for 
the intellect of God, and of participation with the divine life.  
 Williams summarizes in part III of his book on Arius the arguments Arius is trying to 
make by presenting three syllogisms (2005a:231). These syllogisms are related to the three 
areas that will be examined in this section: creation, intellect, and participation.  
i) The Logos is the ground and condition, the rational or intelligible structure of the world; 
But that structure has no existence independent of the world which it structures; 
Therefore the Logos does not exist prior to the divine decision to make the world: en 
hote pote ouk en. 
ii) God the Father is absolute unity, God the son (as the realm of intelligence and 
intelligibles) is multiplicity; But absolute unity cannot be conceptualized by any 
knowing subject without its being distorted into multiplicity (as something existing over 
against a subject). Therefore the Son can have no concept of the Father’s essence, no 
katalepsis. 
iii) The Logos truly exist as a subject distinct from the Father; But the defining qualities, 
the essential life, of one subject cannot as such be shared with another; Therefore the 
divine attributes traditionally and scripturally applied to the Son must be true of him in 
a sense quite different from that in which they are true of the Father. 
 42 
The Logos is part of the creation of the world - no creation, no Logos. God is one, and there 
is no plurality in one, therefore the Son does not have complete access to the Father’s 
intellect. The Logos is what the Father is by metaphor, and not participation. How exactly 
Arius argued for the soundness of these claims is what this thesis will deal with next. This 
will show how Williams presents the philosophical influence as something that makes Arius a 
conservative, as well as un-conservative. This again goes to show how Arius redefined 
theology in the wake of the conflict. Even if his theology was strongly refuted, his 
methodology proved hard to escape. 
4.2 Creation 
 Williams presents Arius’ view on creation as connected to ancient Greek philosophy. 
More specifically, Williams presents concerns regarding time and simplicity. Time is of 
relevance as it is part of Alexander’s critique of Arius. Simplicity is of relevance as it is part 
of Arius’ critique of Alexander. Arius is connected to a philosophical tradition by his attempt 
to present God as a self-determined individual, as Williams will argue. 
4.2.1 Time 
 Williams begins his presentation on philosophical influences in the early church by 
referring to Plato’s Timaeus. This text served as a basis for discussions on the origin of the 
world, and the creation of the cosmos. By the third century these discussions had become 
increasingly wrought with disagreement. This debate again influenced the church, and 
theology. As Williams states: 
What Christian theologians of this period and after found to say about God, creation and the 
beginning of time must be seen against the background of such debates. On the whole, it is 
impossible to say whether or to what extent any particular theologian knew the work of any 
particular philosopher; but there can be no doubt that for many of the most influential writers 
of the age, from Origen to Eusebius Pamphilus, the contemporary discussion of time and the 
universe shaped their conceptions of what could intelligibly be said of creation. (2005a:181).  
When the early Christian theologians tried to make sense of the God of the bible, and his role 
in creation, they sought the help of philosophy. The notion of God as creator was biblically 
based, but what this actually meant – and what it said about God and his economia – they 
investigated by way of Plato.  
To Plato the universe must have a cause. It does not exist stably, but is in the process 
of coming to be, and so it must have an arche. Seeing as this beginning has a cause – and it 
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results in beauty - it must be based on what is higher and better: an eternal world. The world 
is not created ex nihilo, but by making order out of chaos – there is formless matter. ‘The 
builder’ creates living beings to reflect him, and also time for the beings to move. “Time came 
into being (gegonen) along with the heavens” (Williams 2005a:182). Time is thus a result of 
creation. 
Aristotle criticized Plato for presenting a universe that apparently had a punctiliar 
beginning, but would have no end (182). If the cosmos has a beginning it is capable of not-
existing, but if it is endless there can be no time where it is not. If it has a beginning, it will 
have an end. If it is capable of not-existing, it can always ‘not-exist’. If it exists, it cannot be 
capable of endless non-existence, so it will always exist, and has always existed. The cosmos 
is unique in that it is not created within time, but time is created within it. To Aristotle the 
cosmos must be agenetos.  
 The Judeo-Christian notion of a creation ex nihilo at a specific time, presented by 
Philo, was a new one in philosophical terms according to Williams (185). Plato was believed 
to teach that there was a process leading up the beginning of time – a disorderly time, along 
with disorderly motion (184). There is thus a chaos time, and up to about the third century 
matter was considered to be co-eternal with God. God simply organized what was already 
there (184). Form was considered to be active – it has to form ‘something’ – while matter was 
passive - it has to receive form. Form is eternally in the primal nous, who generates the ideas 
out of what it is - and it is what it is by contemplation of the One (185). It was part of a 
process. Aristotle, however, does not agree with this process. One cannot separate form and 
matter. “There is no pure matter ‘lying around’ waiting for some new form to unite with it 
[…]” (185). Everything is made out of something: from something to something. Matter is 
never new, and so there can never be a process of nothing turning into something. This is why 
Williams state that Philo was the first to claim that “God caused matter and its rational 
structure to come into being at a point” (2005a:185). Form and matter are connected, and they 
come into being at a punctiliar beginning - at God’s will. This means that the world of forms 
came as a result of Gods will. Which means that God is what he is quite independently of the 
world of forms. Williams has thus presented a development that opens for the possibility of 
‘God as he is’ and ‘God as creator’ to be unconnected – as with the polemic of Methodius (d. 
ca. 311). 
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 All this confusion over matter, form and time eventually leads up to Arius and 
Alexander. Alexander is trying to force Arius into a corner where he has to admit that they are 
talking about a time gap – a diastema – between Father and Son. A diastema is by Methodius 
an interval or distance that can be measured, which is a definition of time. Time is motion; 
motion is change; God cannot change. There is no diastema in eternity (186). However, 
something happened that was not always so: creation – which Athanasius accuses Arius for 
teaching happened in two turns. This difference, or separation, means change, and change 
means time. This seems to imply that there is time between God and his Son, much like time 
in this world. Still, Arius attempts to avoid presenting a notion of time between Father and 
Son, as that between Creator and Creature more generally (189). He, on the other hand, 
accuses Alexander of neglecting the Fathers precedence over the Son thus complicating the 
begetting of the Son (189). By refusing to use diastema Alexander seems to imply that the 
begetting of the Son made no difference for the Father – thus compromising the first 
principle. Alexander is threatening the simplicity of God.  
4.2.2 Simplicity 
 Williams presents the need of Arius to separate between Father and Son as influenced 
by the understanding of the monad and the dyad, or singularity and multiplicity. Williams 
begins by presenting Methodius and how he held to the simultaneous appearance of 
multiplicity and the material world. Multiplicity, refracted through the Logos, is an 
occurrence that happens at creation. This is to counteract the Origenian view of “the idea of 
the Father’s simplicity being mediated as a ‘world of ideas’ through the Son’s beholding of 
the Father” (Williams 2005a:190). The Orgenian view clearly presents the priority of the 
Logos, by the Logos being before it. From this, stating that creation came about as a result of 
the Logos contemplation makes it a short step to state that Logos exist for the sake of creation 
(190). And further more, considering Methodius, it is possible to see how this presents the 
Logos as the result of God’s will; thus having a punctiliar beginning somewhere between 
Gods eternity, and the cronos of the universe (191). Williams does not state that Methodius 
concludes thusly, but that it is possible to do so. Origenian cosmology opens a few doors, in 
regards to free will when the co-eternity of rational subsistents is dismissed. Williams relates 
this to Arius by presenting a gnomic line from the Thalia: “You should understand that the 
Monad [always] was, but that the Dyad was not before it came to be.” Williams here takes 
Dyad to mean “the first level of being beyond or below primordial unity” (191). ” Plurality 
 45 
comes forth by singularity. By trying to incorporate duas into the monad one inadvertently 
threatens the divine simplicity.  
 Williams, once again, presents Arius as being potentially influenced by a pre-existing 
tradition. Leading up to the third century there is a move from Plato and Aristotle, and a 
primitive ‘two principles’ cosmology, to an understanding where plurality is derived from 
unity (192). Anatolius, Plotinus and Iamblichus, are taken as representatives of this tradition, 
however only the initial two will be presented due to the limitations of this thesis. To 
Anatolius the dyad is the “the first stage of separation from the monad, and is related to the 
monad as matter is to form” (Williams 2005a:191). The monad is active, while the dyad is 
passive, and so the monad affects the plurality in order to unify. “The monad is shown to be 
not merely unity in-and-for-itself but a unity that actively unites; and for it to appear thus it 
must generate an amorphous plurality on which it can work” (192). It is the ‘refracted’ eikon 
of a unifying principle, influencing the form of the dyad, - but not allowing it to be identical, 
or influential, to what is represents. Plotinus presents matter to exist in this world as that 
which form acts upon. Matter is distance from the One, and while distancing itself from the 
one, it reflects the one – however not in true likeness because it is different; it is potentiality. 
The dyad is shaped by the One, an effect of the one, but not willed by the One (193). “It 
moves, or affects, what it is not simply by being what it is” (194). By oneness facing what it is 
not – potentiality – and as one speaks about a relationship between the two, the dyad comes 
forth. From his presentation, Williams has shown that there was a development in Platonic 
philosophy after the third century (195). They differed on their understanding of how this 
relates to the nous, but there seems to be a miljeu in Alexandrian theology dealing 
apophatically with the first principle. 
Williams argues that there are indication that Arius came in contact with this tradition, 
presented above (Williams 2005a:195). One of these indications are found in Arius’ use of the 
word duas in regards to Logos. Earlier he quoted Arius’ Thalia, and Arius evidently used 
duas as a title for the Logos. Also, Williams considers it unsurprising if Arius knew 
something about Anatolius and might even have shared Methodius’ anti-Origenian views 
(196). The Son is begotten at a point, but not in time, rather together with time. The important 
point Williams want to make, is that God is now independent of the ideas or forms, and thus 
not connected to creation as a necessity from God’s part. The difference between Arius and 
the post-Plotinus tradition is in how God retains nous – which is what enables will – thus 
lessening the extreme transcendence of the tradition. God creates not as much a result of 
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‘natural processes’, but as a result of his own will and self-determination. God has a mind - a 
nous. So even if Arius used a philosophical vocabulary, his intention is still distinctly 
Christian: God chose to create out of love (198). To Arius the freedom of God was not simply 
about unrelatedness, but about God’s self-determination. What he did, he did because he 
chose to, and this is what Williams sees Arius as employing philosophy to support. 
In summary, Arius, and Alexander for that matter, uses arguments found in 
philosophical cosmology, which had a tradition for being debated in Alexandria, when 
debating theology. The conflict between the two was connected to which philosophical 
concern should be given precedence. Arius attempted to argue for a distinct Christian 
understanding of creation by employing philosophical arguments. Though Williams does not 
necessarily agree with him on the soundness of his arguments, he nonetheless presents him as 
a theological serious exegete. 
4.3 The mind 
 Williams again aims to show how Arius is standing on the cusp of an earlier tradition, 
this time in terms of God’s intellect. And again he starts with classical Greek philosophy. 
From Plato we have the notion of nous and noeta. The Demiurge is a mind of sorts (nous), 
while the autozoon - the container of the rational form – is the object of the mind, the 
intelligibles. This notion proved problematic because it assumed that there could be an eternal 
object as well as an eternal subject. There had to be a hierarchy between the thought and what 
the thought rests on. There was a move, as Williams presents it, in the direction of ‘isolating’ 
the first principle (200). God is becoming un-intelligible. This progress is evident with 
Plotinus, which is where Williams starts. 
 Plotinus started out with a notion of the first principle being noetos, but he later 
separated the One from any kind of intellection. He asks “whether self-understanding is 
necessarily something possible only for a complex reality – that is, one with a ‘knowing’ and 
a ‘known’ part” (200). If one has a contemplating part, and a part being contemplated, then 
one does not have complete access to oneself; he would be an object to himself. It is hard to 
think of nous, understanding, as not understanding itself. Nous has to be the same as what it 
understands, and it exists only for its own sake (201). When attempting to work out whether 
there is something beyond nous, Plotinus argues that the nous creates separation by actively 
seeking understanding; by understanding something there is inescapably multiplicity - it 
involves duplication and distancing: “it seeks itself in otherness” (201). Williams presents 
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Plotinus to understand nous as being close to the One in its openness, but separated by the 
creation of multiplicity of trying to realize itself, and so the One eternally eludes the nous. 
“The One cannot be known, nor can it know” (201). Understanding is about motion, and the 
One cannot have motion, as that would speak of a need. Plotinus does not see the One as 
having self-awareness, as that would mean desire – and thus distance. By the One eluding the 
nous it also eludes objectification, and as such it is not graspable by word or thought: “There 
is nothing there to know, yet there is everything there” (Williams 2005a:202). This is the 
backbone of apophatic theology: being unable to say what is there, only what is not. Williams 
describes Plotinus as one who does more than formulating another apophatic theology; he 
connects it to the very nature of understanding. In the nous’ continual search for 
understanding - in trying to comprehend - it objectifies, and the object created is itself. In its 
quest to understand more, it understands more of itself, thus understanding more of the One, 
as it originates from the One. This dance of not-knowing to knowing is what generates and 
creates new forms and images. 
Williams goes on to describe how this relates to later Juedaeo-Christian tradition by 
presenting Philo’s and Origen’s take on the whole situation. With Philo, the realm of form is 
equated with the mind of God. God is nous, while the logos is what contains the noetic world 
and rational forms, the autozoon. The logos is not coterminous with the divine mind – only 
God knows fully what he is, and this knowledge is not accessible for the created mind, 
through the logos. God as nous, and man as nous is not the same, as “his ‘intellectuality’ is 
not defined by the noetic world, as ours is” (Williams 2005a:204). Philo does not make the 
logos into a subject, and so does not deal with the second principle’s knowledge of the first. 
This distinction between Father and Son, nous and logos, is, however, dealt with more 
extensively by Clement and Origen. Williams propose that, considering the context, nous 
pertains to an expression of divine simplicity. At the same time, Origen is well aware that the 
father is more than nous; he is the father of every nous – he brings it into being, so the 
description must in some way be compatible to what he is (205). With Origen the Son 
contemplates the Father, and thus creates the world. He emanates from the Father, and looks 
upon the Father’s divine simplicity and sees infinite variety – thus being infinite potentiality 
itself, as in him all things come to be. The difference between Plotinus and Origen is the 
latter’s need to emphasise that God has a will, and thus a mind and self-understanding. God’s 
generative power is based on a conscious decision, and so, as Williams states it, it can be seen 
as intelligent love (205). This is what challenges the Neoplatonic view of a purposeless deity. 
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The question of what the Son can know about the Father was important in the critique 
of Arius. Williams ties this in with Plotinus, as shown above, and with Origen. In dealing with 
how far Origen parallels Plotinus in this, he proposes that to Origen, “the Father […] does not 
have extra information; but – presumably – he knows his own simplicity as simplicity, while 
the Son knows it as cause and source of the multiple world of rational forms” (Williams 
2005a:206).  There seems to be an asymmetry of sorts, which begs the question: How is this 
different than how Plotinus views the second principle as not having complete knowledge of 
the first principle (complete disjunction)? However, for Origen, there was another element to 
consider: To state that the Son did not have perfect access to the father, thus complicating the 
Son’s role as eikon, and his statements of unity with the Father, was improper, to say the least. 
The problem of how the Son knows the father continued to linger on. Later ‘neo-Arians’ said 
“that to know God as agennetos is to know his ousia” (207), while later Nicenes said that “the 
Father was known wholly and perfectly by the Son, because the Father’s ousia was wholly 
communicated to the Son” (208). Williams uses the last two quotes, as well as other 
traditions, to build a case for the relevance of the question of the Son’s knowledge of the 
Father in fourth-century theology. The question touched was of paramount importance for 
how theological truth could be understood – how it is possible to speak rightly about God – 
and how this again relates to the praxis of the church. Arius was unique, thought perhaps with 
a slight parallel in Origen, in that he emphasized disjunction over the Son’s ability to present 
an accurate, truthful, image of the Father. This leads Williams to conclude, by the wordings of 
Kannengiesser, that “Arius entire effort consisted precisely in acclimatizing Plotonic logic 
within biblical creationism” (209). Arius was unique, and controversial, in that he used 
Plotinus to safeguard the voluntary creation of God. 
Williams states that to understand the radicalness of Arius, one cannot ignore the 
influence of philosophers he shares so many parallels with (213). Williams also caution 
against ‘the fantasy’ of Arius as one who tries to “diminish the dignity of the Logos” (210). 
To Arius, the nous, the logos, is dependent upon the dunamis of the Father; the Son knows 
himself and the Father according to what the Father is. The Father is knowable because, in his 
unknowability, he emanates, though fragmented, because of his own self-contemplation. 
Williams purports that if what has been stated thus far in this chapter is accurate, then Arius is 
following Origen in presenting the Son, Logos, within the world of intelligible realities (212). 
Furthermore, Arius is following Origen into what this means for the divine intellect, although 
coming to an un-Origenian conclusion. 
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Supposing Arius to have taken for granted the anti-Origenian ‘backlash’ of the second half of 
the third century, supposing him to have sought for a logically tighter version of Methodius’ 
assertion of the ‘distance’ between God and the intelligible world so as to underline the 
doctrine of a free creation and the essential indescribability of the creator, the philosophical 
environment we have been examining would offer many of the tools he needed. (Williams 
2005a:213) 
Williams presents Arius as a theological exegete, without interest in metaphysics or 
cosmology in their own right, who still uses the tools and arguments present in those areas to 
build his case. Just what case that is has been touched upon: the transcendence and free will of 
God. However to better understand what made Arius unique, Williams propose that we look 
closer at the ‘analogical’ continuity between Father and Son (213). 
4.4 Analogy and Participation  
 Williams continues his search for the uniqueness of Arius by way of analogy and 
participation. This is again connected to a tradition, a process, and Williams begins his 
rendering of this process by bringing to attention a classical metaphysical question: “How is it 
that the same name or word attaches to a diversity of things?” (Williams 2005a:215). And 
again Williams follows the thread back to Plato. Plato tries to answer the question by 
presenting ‘forms’ and ‘ideas’: Forms are unified by the forms participating in a transcendent 
reality - an idea - which is also the source of the object. Plato was particularly interested in 
how “sameness” can be attributed to the different virtues. Williams uses the example of how 
both Ghandi and Socrates can be considered wise: they must share in the ‘ideal’ substance of 
wisdom (215). While Plato start out by considering this “sameness” in terms of maximation 
(as wise as can be), he soon abandons the notion in favour of one that sees the lower form as 
participating in the higher idea. This means that they do not share particularity, but rather that 
the idea is what causes the particularity. Williams exemplifies this by how person ‘a’ can have 
characteristic ‘c1‘ and person ‘b’ ‘c2‘. What makes them ‘c’s’ at all are their relation to the 
ideal ‘c’, while ‘c’ itself does not participate in its own ‘c-ness’. It is like a reflection in a 
mirror: what it is is simply a reflection of the original – the idea (216). Participation is thus in 
antiquity understood as the relation between particular and form (217). The process Williams 
describes, leading up to Arius, evidently starts with Plato. 
Williams was said to believe that conflict was the seed of progress, in a manner of 
speaking. This can be demonstrated by how Plato’s understanding of participation was 
criticised by Aristotle. With Aristotle, as shown above, there is no separation between form 
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and idea, and so there cannot be a “prior reality of which the particulars can have a share” 
(217). Similarity in form did not lead back to some ideal ‘c’; their similarity was a metaphor – 
it was just that the essential qualities of similar, but different, objects could be compared. This 
is participation by ‘synonymy’, or ‘univocity’: the same word means the same thing, even 
when describing differing objects or situations (‘God is good’, and ‘man is good’, is the same 
‘goodness’). Apart from this it made little sense in speaking of  ‘participation’. Non-
participating substances are related by linguistic design, called ‘homonymy, or ‘equivocity: 
“they have a different logos tes ousias,” as Williams relates it (218). Aristotle’s different 
types of equivocity is by Porphyry classified into categories. Apart from the accidental 
homonyms, there are four intentional homonyms: likeness, analogy, prosegoria, and telos.5
Participation and analogy is connected to theology, and to Arius, because it speaks of 
the accessibility of God. Williams prepares this argument by demonstrating how Plato 
imagined accessibility to ‘what is higher’. To Plato, the ‘Form of the Good’ was the ultimate 
principle, and it is to the world of ideas what the sun is the material world. The Good and the 
One are both beyond structure – they consist of nothing beside themselves, nor can they be 
understood in terms of anything else (218). Still, the ultimate principle is not beyond 
definition – it is defined by its own intelligible structure. As Williams states: “’The Good 
beyond finite beings may for Plato have been limited by itself, in the sense of a limit beyond 
other limits’, and the One also appears to be a ‘limit of limits’, neither wholly escapes ‘limit’ 
itself” (
 
Williams has thus presented two conflicting tradition, one of participation, and one of 
analogy. He then continues to present how this affected theology. 
219). Plato’s first principle is a harmonizing power – an active beginning - and not a 
distant one-in-itself. As limited, defined, it is also accessible to the mind. Plato’s simile of the 
Divided Line shows how it is possible to move up to knowledge of the intelligible world. The 
mind can climb the hierarchy of reality because particulars are connected with the world of 
form, and the ultimate form of ‘the good’, making it possible to know ‘Goodness’ 
analogically. God is a case of intelligible reality, thus he is among the noeta as Plutarch states 
it (219). As forms are ‘participated’ by particulars, God is ‘participated’ by the ideal forms 
(220). This perspective belongs the ‘Middle Platonist,’ who saw the world as an image of the 
first principle. “This is why the third and fourth Christian centuries are such a significant and 
turbulent period in the development of religious epistemology” (Williams 2005a:220). 
                                                             
5 Likeness: sharing some attributes. Analogy: standing in the same relation as the other (roof of mouth). Prosegoria: same purposive function (medicinal). Telos: produce 
same effect (healthy). WILLIAMS, R. 2005a. Arius - Heresy and tradition, 2.ed. Wales, SCM Press. p. 218 
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Williams has by presenting Plato’s ‘participation’ prepared for how the Church of the third 
and fourth century faced a changing milieu, as this platonic notion of an accessible God got 
challenged.  
Williams present Arius as one who uses Neoplatonic arguments in a predominately 
Middle Platonic environment. Neoplatonism, who in effect dismantled the access the Middle 
Platonists had to God through his creation, started talking about ‘procession’ (formed by 
higher, but not sharing essence) instead of ‘participation’. There is univocity between form 
and particular: “a can be called f because some aspect of its existence can be understood by 
reference to a central or normative fact of something being f; but a’s f-ness is not itself a case 
of f that can stand alongside the normative f” (220). This ties back to Aristotle, and his pros 
hen argument (telos above), where a meal, a climate, and a diet all can be said to be healthy – 
but only a person can be healthy in the words proper meaning. There is thus no 
‘participation’, and the forms are not imitations of the Form of the Good. While there is a 
negative theology to be found in Middle Platonism – God cannot be grasped fully - it still did 
not go to the same extent as Plotinus did. He even denies a deliberate decision on the side of 
the One in creation; the nous ‘emerges’ from the One in total otherness, as overflow (221). 
With Iamblichus it is also argued that no “ousia can be part of another ousia” (222). Williams 
ties this in with Arius, as states: “Arius, like Iamblichus, condemns the idea of a fusion of 
substances into a ‘consubstantial’ compound: the Son is no a homoousios ‘portion’ of the 
Father: (2005a:222). The Son has no participation in God’s nature. Neither can Father and 
Son be part of a common form of Godhead, as that would point to something beyond the two. 
Williams presents the climate in Alexandria as being almost void of Neoplatonic influences – 
a climate where it was still possible to talk about a participation of the divine ousia. “In 
short,” Williams states, “when we look at Arius’ attack on Alexander’s theology, we see, at 
the very least, a close parallel to the Neoplatonist dismantling of earlier Platonic models of 
God’s relation to the world” (224). Arius is a ‘post-Plotinian’ who holds to specific acts of 
revelation, and who also assigns a will and a mind to God. 
 Arius uniqueness is a result of him framing his theology in a Neoplatonic language. 
He is unique in that he is not positioned within mainstream theology, nor is he a full out 
Neoplatonist. This leaves him open for attacks. How can the Son be said to have any part in 
God at all, considering how he is unable to share God’s ousia? It almost seems like the Son, 
in his oppositeness, is left with divine attributes understood more like metaphors. This is 
especially difficult for Arius, who also holds to the role of the Son in revealing “saving 
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knowledge of the Father, to create in us a transforming gnosis” (225). There is no room in 
Neoplatonic thought of a mediator, bridging the gulf between absolute and contingent. Arius 
solves this by again reverting back to the free and active will of the Father. The Son is what 
he is because the Father wants it – he is wisdom because the truly ‘wise’ God willed it (226). 
There is no automation in the Son’s role as eikon; it is a result of God willing it so. Arius’ 
mediator is one who is endowed with all the glory a creature can contain, one who has no 
resistance, and thus has been given the title Son. As Son, he praises the Father, and by being 
turned toward one who is greater, he is showing us what we could not see - the limitation of 
the Logos reveals the limitless-one behind him. “A Plotinian style of negative theology is 
being quite skilfully deployed in defence of some very un-Plotinian conclusions” (228). One 
of the challenges Williams sees with this is in regards to whether or not this ‘will’ reveals 
God’s nature or not. If it does, then one is in essence close to what is said at Nicea. If it is not, 
then we are left with a whimsical God – a divine void. Williams concludes by saying “the 
problems set up by the extreme apophatic consequences of the third-century shift in 
philosophical thinking cannot be sidestepped by the appeal to a will without a fundamental 
irrationality being introduced into the Godhead itself” (2005a:229). To Williams, Arius is one 
who addressed relevant philosophical concerns of the era, though reaching a difficult, if not 
impossible, theological conclusion.  
4.5 Summary 
 What Williams has been getting at through his presentation is that Arius’ has a distinct 
metaphysical and cosmological outlook. It is different from Eusebius of Caesarea, and from 
Athanasius. He has left Middle-Platonisism – with knowledge of God through creation – and 
is closer to a Neoplatonic world. While not being a philosopher, he uses philosophy to arrive 
at some, for Williams, difficult positions: There is nothing more to be said of God other than 
that he has a free will; effectively reducing God to bare potentiality (231). It is this that makes 
him a heresiarch. His view of creation as created by the Logos, at a point, was not 
controversial – even his view of the Logos as created for the sake of creation was not all that 
radical. The Son’s ignorance of the Father was more problematic, but it makes sense when 
viewed against a Middle Platonic / Neoplatonic debate. That the Logos does not really 
possess divine attributes was, and is, even harder to swallow. It made it difficult to say 
anything about God at all, and it reduced the eikon to a poor reflection of an arbitrary God. 
The Arian heresy came about as a result of fusing conservative themes with a very un-
 53 
conservative ontology (232). He is conservative in his methodology, and use of philosophy, 
but radical in his conclusions. 
4.6 Aftermath 
 Williams wrote the book in order to present Arius without the distortion created by the 
polemic of Athanasius (2005a:134). He hopes that revealing what actually happened in this 
crisis will help shed light on how this event determined the future of theology. An influence 
that still effects contemporary discussion – especially in how to understand the nature of 
doctrinal continuity: “questions which the mere fact that there was a doctrinal crisis in the 
fourth century presses upon us” (244). The book attempts to give focus to some of these 
questions. So just what is the result of the Nicene crisis? 
 Arianism as a defined heretical group is by Williams understood as a post-Nicene 
development, and it is thus misleading. It gives off the impression of there being a distinct 
group with defined identity called Arians. However, as Williams states it: “there was no such 
thing in the fourth century as a single, coherent ‘Arian’ party” (233). Arianism is rather a 
description of those opposed to the process leading up to the council, and the result of it. 
Arians had a conservative view on the role of the presbyter vis-à-vis the bishop, and they held 
to the authority in the inspired ascetic teacher, as represented by Arius (233). Arius also 
addresses what he sees as shortcomings in the Middle Platonic understanding of a hierarchical 
approach to God, through participation, and follows the path of apophatic theology to what he 
sees as logical conclusion. And though Arius did made converts to his view, he was never 
seen as a leader of a movement. Williams emphasize the lack of a distinct Arian identity, 
because this has influence on how the sides of the conflict are to be viewed, and what this 
tells of the influence of Athanasius. 
 The influence of Athanasius is by Williams further demonstrated by complicating the 
traditional understanding of the conflict further. By dismantling the identity of Arianism, 
Williams makes it more visible how the definition of sides as ‘Catholic’ and ‘Heretic’ is a 
post Nicene development. To understand the conflict in those terms is to be clouded by 
Athanasius in ones understanding of the event. “It is very far from being a struggle by ‘the 
Church’ against a ‘heresy’,” as Williams describes it, “formulated and propagated by a single 
dominated teacher; rather it is, in large part, a debate about the continuity possible and 
necessary in the Church’s language” (234). The Arian fraction regarded themselves as 
preservers of central formulae about God as anarchos and so forth. They tried to preserve 
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what they saw as central to the scripture, while having to step outside the simple reiteration of 
what had already been stated; it was necessary to speak with a new language, to preserve the 
tradition. It is this language that was debated, and the danger is in seeing the post-Nicene 
language as already there – as with Lindbeck (presented more thoroughly in the next chapter). 
 One word that can describe the result of the Nicene controversy is theology, as 
Williams describes it. It became important to say new things with new arguments, while still 
claiming it was the same being said. Arius had seen the need for a critical and logical defence 
of tradition when challenged by theological vagueness in his day (235). While Arius’ 
arguments might be debated, the fact that there was a debate proved influential; the need for 
conceptual innovation was recognized, with the added need to do justice to the praxis of the 
church. “The doctrinal debate in the fourth century is thus in a considerable measure about 
how the Church is to become intellectually self-aware and to move from a ‘theology of 
repetition’ to something more exploratory and constructive” (Williams 2005a:235). By not 
allowing language to develop, by strict adherence to an archaic language, one is actually in 
danger of betraying the faith one is trying to preserve – like with homoousios. Williams once 
again describes theology as something originating in worship, and trying to express this in 
new ways, by keeping the language open. As he himself states it: 
There is a sense in which Nicaea and its aftermath represents a recognition by the Church at 
large that theology is not only legitimate but necessary. The loyal and uncritical repetition of 
formulae is seen to be inadequate as a means of securing continuity and anything more than a 
formal level; Scripture and tradition require to be read in a way that brings out their 
strangeness, their non-obvious and non-contemporary qualities, in order that they may be read 
both freshly and truthfully from one generation to another. They need to be made more 
difficult before we can accurately grasp their simplicities. Otherwise, we read with eyes not 
our own and think them through with minds not our own; the ‘deposit of faith’ does not really 
come into contact with ourselves. And this ‘making difficult’, this confession that what the 
gospel says in Scripture and tradition does not instantly and effortlessly make sense, is perhaps 
one of the most fundamental tasks for theology. (Williams 2005a:236)  
The lead up to the council at Nicaea was a tumultuous time, in regards to the identity of the 
church; from persecuted church, to imperial religion. This also meant a reworking of its 
foundation - a critical reflection on its heritage; it saw the need for theology. This need was 
still present in the centuries to come, when a new conflict presented the need for continuity, 
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which lead Williams to conclude that some sort of doctrinal hermeneutics had come to stay. 
(237). 
 Theology as a need for self-awareness is not an old phenomenon. It is still important 
to answer what is at the core of the Christian proclamation; what is its distinctiveness – its 
‘this, not that’. Williams points out that it is important to not let questions regarding the 
identity of the church become silenced by social and ideological explanations of what the 
church is (238). As contemporary concerns in doctrinal theology have shown, proclaiming the 
same gospel now as before is not easy. Some of these contemporary concerns will be 
addressed shortly, suffice to say that it is difficult to know with a large amount of certainty 
what of the current proclamation belongs to the ‘the message’, and what are cultural 
influences. This is again a question of identity, and Williams builds the distinctiveness of the 
Christian identity on the idea of “new creation” (240). This “new creation” is based on an 
event; an event that makes a radical break with what was, creating a rupture – something that 
was not there before. This is what defines the Christian identity; this is what separates ‘this’ 
from ‘that’. Williams thus separates himself from a relativistic position; there is something 
there that gives identity. This is some of the difficulty with Arius, as accused by Athanasius: 
The event didn’t make sense when viewed from the position of Arius; not the incarnation, 
why there was one, or other factor making up the event: Why did God choose to do it thusly, 
and what does this say about who ‘we’ are? There is something in the event that is 
fundamental for the formation of identity, and it is in the “new creation” – in the difference.  
4.7 Conclusion 
 In this chapter the radicalness of Arius has been presented. Williams presents Arius as 
one who took conservative consideration to a radical conclusion. Arius was radical in that he 
emphasized the notion of God’s free and immutable will over the role of Son as revealer of 
God. What is Williams’ contribution to this is in demonstrating how Arius might have been 
influenced by a philosophical tradition. The old interpretive framework was cracking up, and 
Arius attempted to mend it.  
The material, as presented by Rowan Williams, presents the formation of doctrine as a 
result of a process, and as such interconnected with a broad array of historical factors, such as 
culture, philosophy, power and more. However, Williams also points out that the process does 
have a distinct beginning. The process is the result of trying to make sense of one key notion; 
one fundamental that results in a new identity. To Williams this is described by the phrase 
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‘new creation’; something happened that made a rupture between what was, and what now is. 
This crisis event is what needs to be interpreted, and this interpretation leads to doctrines. 
 The result of the conflict was theology. There was a need to interpret old notions with 
new words. It attempted to say the same thing, but it needed more then reiteration to do so. 
There was a growing need for self-awareness; for a more distinct identity. This identity was, 
according to Williams, based on the notion of ‘new creation’. There was something in the 
event – something transformative – that might not have been all that clear. There were 
questions needing answers, like: why did God choose to do thusly? To answer this, and other 
questions like it, theology was needed. 
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Chapter 5: Current doctrinal concerns 
5.1 Introduction 
There are in this thesis more than a few loose ends that need to be tied up, and this 
seems like a suitable time to do just that. In chapter two, when attempting to present the 
hermeneutics of Rowan Williams, insufficient attention could be given to current doctrinal 
concerns. Williams’ view of history as constructed, and as a tool to make learning possible, 
deserves further elaboration. This is also the case with the connection between doctrine and 
identity, and how this relates in a new language. Chapter three and four presented the 
Christological doctrine as a result of a process; a process interconnected with a broad array of 
historical factors, such as culture, philosophy, power and more. Still, this process had an 
origin - a punctilliar beginning – there was an event, and from this event came the need to 
make sense of the difference. How this lines up with current doctrinal concerns is an issue that 
needs to be dealt with.  
 This chapter intends to answer how we can relate to doctrines in a meaningful way, 
considering what has been presented up until now, and how this relates to current 
hermeneutical issues. Williams will now be presented alongside contemporary doctrinal 
concerns. This will achieve two things: First, it will reveal how Williams deals with 
contemporary challenges. Second, it will reveal some of Williams’ uniqueness. From this it 
will be possible to debate the future course of doctrinal theology, based on issues presented by 
Williams, and developed with modern considerations in mind. To do this, this chapter will 
also deal with the intention behind doctrinal criticism, and how Williams relates to its 
challenge. Further, it will investigate if Williams’ view of Doctrines as language has anything 
beneficial to offer, once again considering the challenges. Exactly what this challenge consists 
of will be further elaborated when dealing with historicism. 
5.2 Doctrinal criticism 
So what is the purpose behind doctrinal criticism? What is it one hopes to accomplish 
by this discipline? “Doctrinal criticism,” according to McGrath, “seeks to evaluate the 
reliability and adequacy of the doctrinal formulations of the Christian tradition, by identifying 
what they purport to represent, clarifying the criteria – historical and theological – by which 
they may be evaluated, and, if necessary, restated” (McGrath 1997:vii). The purpose behind 
doctrinal criticism is to investigate the reliability of a doctrine, and to evaluate it based on a 
 58 
set of criteria, which are themselves in need of evaluation. This is what this thesis attempts to 
do; to evaluate the validity of the Christological doctrine, based on the presentation of Rowan 
Williams, and to discuss what criteria is valid in the evaluation of this doctrine. This 
discussion surrounding criteria for judgement will be developed based on how Williams faces 
doctrinal criticism, and how he presents his solution to the problem of making a doctrinal 
claim – a claim to speak the truth. Williams, as stated in chapter two, presents critical 
theology as an enterprise that tries to answer if what is emerging is actually the same as what 
was originally believed (2000:xv). This section will focus on this challenge: the combination 
of the truth claim inherent in doctrine, and whether this truth is comparable to the same truth 
that was originally believed. 
Williams poses the challenge of doctrinal criticism as a question, derived from Wiles:  
“if, as is surely the case, traditional doctrinal statements make claims about what is actually 
true about the universe, how do we respond to those claims in an intellectual climate in which 
they cannot possibly be legitimated?” (Williams and Higton 2007:276). Doctrines claim to be 
carriers of truth, but how can this truth be accessed? As Williams states, the critical study of 
doctrine results in a fragile epistemological foundation for the claim of the doctrine - there is 
no certainty in the claim - but what there is is a heightened awareness of the intensity of the 
experience (277). And it is just this experience I believe is key in understanding Williams’ 
idea of doctrines – and a beneficial path for further discussion. 
I believe Williams makes a good case in seeing the truth of doctrine as connected to 
the Christ event. By so doing, the challenge of – or more accurately, the impossibility in – 
making ontological claims is faced, without eliminating truth completely. To claim that one’s 
interpretation is valid is to position oneself in normative time, as Williams describes it; a 
position where all events are judged (Williams 2005a:23). This would be a form of absolutism 
(literalism), which share much resemblance with Lindbeck’s cognitive-propositional theory, 
where “doctrine function as informative propositions of truth claims about objective realities” 
(Lindbeck 1984:16). The difficulty of presenting an objective truth in a post-Kantian universe 
reveals the untenability of this position. However, McGrath presents a more nuanced picture 
of the position than what Lindbeck does – there is reformulation according to historical 
circumstances (McGrath 1997:16) - which I believe has parallels to Williams. Doctrines can 
be said to be reliable, though not complete, descriptions of reality in that they represent 
something not confined to words; which McGrath sees the Nicene controversy as an example 
of (17). Doctrines can be true in that they are a response to something taken to be true: a 
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transforming event – a new creation – that gives content to an identity in need of a history. 
McGrath mentions in his brief dealings with the ‘cognitive’ theory of doctrine, that 
Giambattista Vico suggested that experience might be captured in words: 
A [sic] initial metaphorical perspective on reality gained through an encounter with the 
domain of experiences gives way to a reductive metonymic analysis of the situation. This 
process of deconstruction is followed by a process of synecdochic reconstruction of the 
relations between the superficial attributes of this encounter with reality and its presumed 
essence, finally yielding a reflective of dialectic of ironic comprehension of that experienced 
reality (McGrath 1997:19)  
The articulation of an event is true, even if the word being articulated does not manage to 
contain the truth as such. The words need to be interpreted to reveal the truth they are said to 
contain. And in this I perceive a reflection of Williams. Truth is better understood as 
coherence than correspondence, but there is truth there: “If Jesus is finally illustrative of 
truths about God which are in principle independent of this particular life and death, doctrine 
will be above all the process of transmitting these truths […] (Williams and Higton 
2007:295). Jesus is what makes it possible to speak of God, and relate to him; without this 
reference to Jesus as more than history, doctrines would make little sense. Just how Jesus 
illustrates truth will be presented shortly. To Williams, truth is connected to the Christ event. 
 Also, Williams proposes a way to access the truth contained in the doctrine, which I 
believe is helpful. This ties in with what has been presented above regarding Williams and his 
continual emphasis on the need for openness. In chapter two Williams was described as 
holding to a poetics of theological creativity, a position that sees “scripture, creed and 
tradition not as historical artifacts whose meaning is equated with the original authorial 
intention behind the texts but rather as scripts for a certain kind of performance, similar to the 
script of a play” (McCurry 2007:415). The words – the signs - in a script are given meaning 
by interaction; by being understood and reinterpreted. There is now a new meaning present; 
one not put there by the author. As such, doctrines are part of the story of where the script has 
gone, and by that also gives witness to where it now is (not). It is by that an Other to the 
reader of the script. Doctrines present the reader with an opportunity to learn by introducing a 
different world into his. Jeffrey McCurry calls it a “text unlimited”, in that it can always say 
more, by interacting with the present world (416). Also, as script, it testifies to a beginning - a 
beginning of this script; an event to which it, and the characters in it, owes its identity. 
Doctrine cannot contain truth, in a literalist understanding, but it can prepare for the move 
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towards truth. Doctrines are practical in that they aid in presenting the strangeness of what is 
hidden in the Christ even. This presentation is a verbal presentation that is communicating in 
the present. The challenge of doctrinal criticism is a matter of uncovering the ‘hidden truth’ 
preserved in the chaotic Jesus event. This uncovering is a process, because the truth hidden is 
not able to fit within words – there is always more. So the uncovering of the ‘truth’ is in actu 
a deconstruction of a language; an opening up - allowing it to say more.  
5.3 Doctrine as language 
The challenge of doctrinal criticism is in how a doctrine can be said to carry any truth 
at all, considering what has been presented in this thesis up until now. It seems like doctrines 
are merely the result of historical processes. However, as stated above, a way out of this is by 
connecting the ‘truth’ to the event it attempts to make sense of. Williams does this by 
presenting Jesus as what is true; as what makes it possible to speak truthfully - which is what 
doctrine attempts to do. Jesus is the one who makes it possible to open up the language, by his 
role as sign. Williams states that: “Signs are signs of what they are not: they are 
transformations of the world by re-ordering it, not destroying it, so that the tension of 
‘otherness’ remains, itself part of the fluid and dynamic nature of sign-making” (Williams 
2000:207). Jesus, as the prime ‘sacrament’, is also a sign: the sign of a new people with God 
(204). In the world’s efforts to contextualise Jesus – to make sense of the difference - it in turn 
re-contextualises itself. Signs reveal the ‘this, not that’ by being the provocative other, itself 
separated from the ‘this’ by having an identity of its own. This is the starting point of a 
hermeneutical dialectic, where the sign evolves by interaction – and in so doing transforms 
the world. A Christian doctrine is a statement of the truth in Christ; it is developed in 
dialogue, solidified in history.  
Williams can also help in trying to understand revelation, and how doctrine tries to 
capture this revelation. As it has been treated extensively in this thesis, William has a dialectic 
understanding of how learning takes place. It is by encountering the ‘other’, and thus 
presenting to the learner that which is strange, or difficult. The scriptures present us with this 
strange world; this world of God, this kingdom of heaven. That’s why a view of the scriptures 
as open – as still being able to communicate – is of such importance. Literal reading is for 
Williams to allow oneself to encounter the strangeness of the text, again and again – not just 
in the words themselves, but also by encountering the text in others (Higton 2004:67). This 
encounter reveals the symbols, which in turn give me a language, and this enables me to 
understand. Language is something I receive by encountering what is different.  
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Revelation is about receiving a new language, of which the doctrines are the grammar. 
This reception is of importance. As Williams says it: “before we speak, we are addressed or 
called” (1986:198). This calling invites us into its world by redefining the boundaries of ours. 
The generative experience – creating what is not there - is what revelation is about. This also 
results in an identity – the ‘this’ that God is makes sense by how the word is lived out by its 
speakers. Thus the word ‘God’ is given content by those who profess their participation in the 
word. Within a Christian framework the original professor is of course Christ, so the term 
‘Christian’ is closely connected to the dialogue with Christ, his identity, and the resulting 
boarders on his name. ‘He is one who calls God Father’ – his ‘Abba’ makes mine ‘Abba’ 
possible. This new language gives me an identity – in Christ. Williams describes Jesus as 
God’s revelation not because he makes things plainer, but because he makes things darker 
(203). He complicates the image present, and by so doing challenges the idols. Jesus makes it 
possible to talk of a transcendent God in a worldly way, with a worldly language. His role as 
symbol is based on how he incorporates a new word – a new meaning – into my world. This 
word is not closed off, but open – based on Christ as word, and then expanded, though always 
founded on Christ. It is revealed through a process of hermeneutics, and this process takes 
place within history. The starting point for this spiral was the life, death and resurrection of 
Jesus. It forced a new self-understanding, based on Jesus as Lord, and the believer as a ‘new 
creation’. 
5.3.1 Postliberalism 
 When trying to understand doctrines within a linguistic framework it is hard to bypass 
postliberalism. Is Williams a post liberalist? Theo Hobson, when dealing with sacramentalism 
and authority, presents Williams as one who “is very serious about the postmodern idea that 
religion should be understood in terms of communicative action” (Hobson 2008). In the 
abstract to his article on the same topic in Scottish journal of theology in 2008 it says that 
“[Williams] expounds the centrality of the Eucharist in cultural-linguistic and semiotic terms” 
(Hobbson 2008). Gary Dorrien describes Williams as one who share affinities with a more 
“’progressive’ form of postliberalism” (2001). Chad C. Pecknold states that: “postliberalism 
found a positive and sympathetic reception in Britain as well, especially amongst theologians 
such as […] Rowan Williams” (Pecknold 2005:118n). By this it appears that Williams is a 
postliberalist, but is this an accurate assumption? Does his take on doctrinal criticism fit 
within this label? 
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To investigate into the relationship between Williams and postliberalism, I will present briefly 
postliberalism by referring to Lindbeck and the criticism against his presentation. Lindbeck 
states that doctrines do not behave the way they should, and that it therefore is a need for a 
more adequate way of understanding their nature and function – a postliberal way (Lindbeck 
1984:7). He goes on to presents three general types that doctrine may be divided into. And 
while it is interesting to see how Williams fit into the cognitive propositional theory, or the 
experiental-expressivist theory, it is for the sake of this thesis more relevant to move straight 
on to the cultural-linguistic theory. This theory presents doctrines as grammatical rules, and 
religion as the language.  “…A religion can be viewed as a kind of cultural and/or linguistic 
framework or medium that shapes the entirety of life and thought. (Lindbeck 1984:33). 
Lindbeck makes this comparison quite extensive, like stating how religion is a communal 
phenomenon influencing the subject, and so it is not just an expression of this subject (33). 
Unlike ‘experiential-expressive’ it does not start with an internal experience, but with the 
acquisition of a language. ‘Form over matter’ – and in this way it resembles the cognitive 
theory (external) (35). With this view of religion there is naturally also implications for 
doctrine. As McGrath presents this position in the Genesis of Doctrine, doctrine must be seen 
in a narrative setting (McGrath 1997:27). It offers an identity to God by describing him, but it 
is not dependent upon the facts as such. 
 Williams states in his article Trinity and Revelation that “Theology, in short, is 
perennially liable to be seduced by the prospect of bypassing the question of how it learns its 
own language” (Williams 1986:197). It is this McGrath accuses Lindbeck of doing (McGrath 
1997:28,30). The language of a doctrine is not just ‘there’. So how does the Christian idiom 
come into being? McGrath presents this position as devoid of external referents. Truth is 
equated with internal consistency (29). That means that the Nicene creed does not make truth 
claims. No ontological reference. According to McGrath Lindbeck presents Athanasius as 
understanding homoousios as a rule of speech, rather than an ontological statement (29). The 
metaphysical aspect of the statement came later. While avoiding the details of this argument, 
it is still hard to accept this proposal, at least at face value, considering what has been 
presented in this thesis. There were factors influencing the Christological conflict from the 
start – including metaphysical factors. That is not to say that there is not a linguistic aspect in 
the controversy, but the problem is rather that this position presents doctrine as evolving in an 
ahistorical vacuum. McGrath also makes a point of how an intrasystemic view of doctrinal 
validity – no reference outside of the system – is problematic, and he therefore suggest that 
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Jesus of Nazareth is the external referent (McGrath 1997:32). These conflicting notions, 
doctrine as a grammar with the need for an external referent, and as an historical event, are 
connected with Williams.  
There are similarities between Lindbeck and Williams, and there are also some key 
differences. The similarities are that they both use language as means to understand and 
explain religion. Language is something that happens to me – something external. Williams 
even state that orthodoxy is “the ‘grammar’ by which we can discern that even wildly 
divergent utterances are being made in one and the same language” (Higton 2004:79). The 
major difference is the role of Jesus. He is the source of the language, and doctrines are what 
makes it possible to speak “about a God who becomes unreservedly accessible in the person 
of Jesus Christ and in the life of Christ’s community” (Higton 2004:81). The openness is 
closely connected with a specific set of commitments – a way of defining an identity – that is 
not intrasystemic. The doctrines testify about the external reference point – and thus they 
should be an aid in keeping the ‘system’ open. One of the errors of Arianism, from this 
perspective, is that, even if this position made more sense considering the concerns at the 
time, it was unable to sustain viability outside of that intellectual milieu (Higton 2004:84). 
Arianism had a timestamp on it by closing itself off, thus making it obsolete – unable to deal 
with new challenges. While Williams will state that “we speak because we are called, invited 
and authorized to speak, we speak what we have been given, out of our new belonging” he 
also states that “this is a ‘dependent’ kind of utterance, a responsive speech” (1986:209). It is 
connected to a revelatory event – a historic event. The world is not simply inserted into the 
texts; there is something more, from outside, thus revelatory, and presented to us in 
‘sameness’, thus able to communicate - all this in the Christ event. It looks similar to what 
Lindbeck states, that “intratextual theology redescribes reality within the scriptural framework 
rather than translating Scripture into extrascriptural categories. It is the text, so to speak, 
which absorbs the world, rather than the world the text” (1984:118). However, they differ on 
their intrasystemic aspect. If the text absorbs the world, then in turn the text is itself absorbed 
by the event. There is an insertion influencing all future interpretation: a hermeneutical key. 
5.4 Historicity 
 There has in this thesis been made both explicit and implicit references to the topic of 
historicity. Williams’ view of history as constructed, as a tool for making learning possible, 
his conviction of doctrines as result of a process - as well as his linguistic approach - all 
connects with this topic. As stated in chapter two, Williams does not hold to the idea of a 
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‘normative time’ - no absolute locus standi. History is constructed in hindsight in order to 
make sense of who we are now. This new identity also results in a new language – a language 
that keeps unfolding as we are faced with the difference revealed in our history. This 
unfolding – this process – both results in doctrines, as well as interprets doctrine. It thus 
appears that history, and doctrine, is constructed out of a consensus – which is what 
historicity argues. 
 Historicism sees everything in history as being a result of specific social contexts – 
e.g. the socio-political, theological and philosophical factors dealt with in this thesis – and 
that truth as such cannot be understood ontologically, but rather symbolically. One of the 
proponents of historicism, made reference to several times already in this thesis, S. G. 
Davaney, states that theology of historicism assumes “that the historical realm, broadly 
construed, is the only arena of human activity and knowledge and [that it] [repudiates…] 
traditional forms of foundationalism and correspondence theories of truth” (Davaney 
1991:201). She also writes, when dealing with Williams Dean, that “they acknowledge that 
historical reality is created through interpretation of the historical subject – that it is history 
that makes history” (202). There is always an interpretation taking place – nothing is in 
‘normative time’ as Williams would say. Williams obviously addresses some historicist 
concerns in his view on history – it is impossible not to – but how far does he follow this 
position? To answer this question it is interesting to compare how historicism positions itself 
in terms of truth, identity and the place of the past. 
5.4.1 Truth 
 The historicist approach to truth is a matter of consensus, as stated above; what is true 
cannot be known, only accepted. Thus, religion, or the truth claims within it, is viewed as 
human constructs. Terrence Reynolds, in treating historicism, truth claims, and the teaching 
of ethics, while comparing Nietzsche and Davaney, points out that the impact on truth claims, 
in theology or ethics, is powerful. He then goes on to quote Davaney:  
…Truth is that which in any given historical moment can make its will felt, can bring 
about its effect. The distinction between truth and falsehood is not a question of 
ontological validity but of which forms of discourse are accepted as truth, both by 
virtue of coercion and because of the possibilities such realms of discourse bring into 
being […]. That is, not an ontology of truth but a politics of truth is what is demanded 
today. (Reynolds 1996:93) 
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Truth is a matter of acceptance, knowing that what one accepts is really culture. There is no 
access to reality. As such it is imperative to be open: open towards the past and the present. 
 The importance of openness is evident with Davaney’s own historicist approach, that 
of pragmatic historicism. Pragmatic historicism follows historicism in acknowledging the 
historical character of human existence and of all human activity and institutions. Everything 
humans do are done within the context of place and time. With this in mind, absoluteness 
must be given a more temporal character – there is a suspicion present. This suspicion must 
be directed towards everything - even on historicism itself. And this is what Davaney does. 
While acknowledging the historical character of a position, it also acknowledges its own, thus 
opening for self-criticism. Davaney’s complaint of historicists, such as postliberals and 
revisionist, is that they do not “carry through their positions to fully historicist conclusions” 
(Davaney 2000:147). The pragmatic historicist seeks to converse with a variety of disciplines 
in order to locate the human matrix; a matrix constructed by man because he is man. Humans 
are world creators, which is “what we heuristically call religious traditions […]” (148). This 
matrix is internally pluralistic, “composed of multiple contending and contested elements” 
(148). This idea of the world, of history and of identity as chaotic - as pluralistic – reveals 
why it is important to be open; to not close the system by labelling one perspective as truth. 
 The consensus of ‘truth’ does not receive support from the past. What was considered 
to be true does not have superiority over what we now should consider to be true. As Jan-Olav 
Henriksen summarizes in Teologi i dag, “[Davaney] emphasizes that no position can have 
superior authority based exclusively on being recognized as a valid solution to a former 
situational and contextual problem (Henriksen 2007:146) (translation mine). A position – a 
doctrine - is not deemed final simply on basis of its track record. The truth-worthiness of a 
doctrine is determined by an evaluation made in the present; a position held to be true by 
history can be overturned by the present. Thus ‘truth’ is a process in the making. 
 To Davaney theology is a mode of cultural analysis, and this is its value (2000:149). It 
no longer search for truth, but it aims to evaluate and assess a traditions function. Good 
theology is theology that contributes to our current historical position. This reveals the 
pragmatic position of Davaney’s historicist approach. However, the pragmatic aspect – the 
evaluation in the present - is not disconnected from the past. Au contraire, it is from the past 
we develop a set of norms. 
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5.4.2 History 
 It is tempting to ask how one should deal with history considering that it has no 
precedence in making judgements. Is it to be discarded? This is where Davaney separates 
herself from other modern position. The non-finality of a position is not the same as starting 
from scratch, as Henriksen points out (2007:147). He further emphasizes how Davaney 
presents the past as what enables the conditions in the present (147). The standard we use to 
evaluate has its own history:  
Norms or standards of judgement do not simply appear, unrelated to an unentangled from the 
past. In large part what we take to be normative in any present era is a product of our dense 
histories, significantly shaped by the past out of which we and our traditions have come. For 
pragmatic historicism, then, even the most novel portrayal of reality and the most audaciously 
innovative criteria for judgement are situated and as such indebted to what has gone before 
and to their current environment. Our normative imaginings and judgements, as all other 
dimensions of human life, are traditioned. (Davaney 2000:150) 
This awareness is an awareness of the impossibility of ‘starting from scratch’, because one 
will always be influenced by history. The judgement in the present cannot be disassociated 
with the past, even if the arguments for its continued relevance are based on contemporary 
concerns. This again leads to a pragmatic take on history. As Adonis Vidu states when 
dealing with Davaney: “The past has a function only if we are able to locate within it 
resources that can contribute to make our contemporary search for a meaningful life more 
successful. But the decision as to the adequacy of those recourses has to be justified according 
to present and public norms” (2007:216). The past is the pool from where we can draw 
understanding of who we are, and why we are just that. 
 Davaney presents history as being open, and instructional at the same time, though 
without precedence over the present. “Tracing the complex historical factors that shape us 
crucially contributes to our understanding of why certain values, practices, and visions of 
human life carry weight for us. But such tracing does not exhaust our responsibility to present 
rationales on behalf of our claims today” (Davaney 2000:152). The normative position for a 
valued judgement on a positions claim to truth is the ever-fleeting present. Justification for the 
validity of the Christian claims is not based on “it is written”, but “is it reasonable today”. 
And to make that contemporary judgement it is paramount to enter into dialogue; dialogue 
with history, and with the present. Past, present, future; hopes, aspirations, dreams – all 
aspects of life must be engaged in dialogue – and this dialogue must take place publicly.  
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5.4.3 Identity 
 Historicism has an acute awareness of the role of language in the formation of an 
identity. This again connects with Williams. In chapter two he was presented as seeing history 
as constructed. At the same time a reference was made to Kaufmann, and his view of humans 
being world constructors. This again ties in with language, because to Kaufman the 
development of language is connected to man’s interaction with the world. We need a 
framework, and this framework is dependent upon the symbols created. As Davaney quote 
Kaufman: “We cannot gain orientation in life and cannot act without some conception or 
vision of the context within which we are living and moving, and without some understanding 
of our own place and role within that context” (Davaney 1991:204). Our identity is connected 
to language – a language Kaufman sees as the foundation for any interpretation of life taking 
place (reality remains hidden). To Davaney this results in a dualism, in that while man is in a 
biosocial world, as a creator of world, he is not coparticipant with that world; his experience 
is structured by language, but there is no clear notion of how experience structures language. 
“Thus,” as Davaney states, “ even within his system, where both self and world are constructs 
of the imagination, he develops a picture of the relationship between the two that is 
unidirectional, in which the constructive agency is almost exclusively on the part of the 
human knower” (217). What Kaufman fails to account for is the way the webs of realities are 
networks of power that are not innocent, but have social and political repercussions (219). 
Our understanding of the world, and our relation to it – our identity – is based on words, 
signs, which make up this world. The grid for our identity is constructed – which begs the 
question of how it began in the first place. 
 To Davaney, the pluralistic aspect of any tradition must be included in what is to be an 
identity. Humans are multi-traditioned, as opposed to mono-traditioned. While Kaufman 
rejects any notion of a Christian essence, Davaney points to the conglomeration of all that has 
happened through history (Davaney 2000:89). Identity is something continually in the 
making, in intermingling of contemporary as well as historical factors (110). Identity is not 
readymade, but part of a struggle: an attempt to make sense of it all, considering all factors. 
While doing this, the pragmatic historicist is also aware of how it by identifying something, it 
also in the process leaves others out. The ‘this, not that’ can be detrimental to the ‘that’ not 
being recognized. And so pragmatic historicism seeks to inquire into the effects of our identity 
making (170). 
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 The concern pragmatic historicism has regarding identity can be linked to the struggle 
in the fourth century already mentioned. Who has authority to speak for this group? In an 
article in Journal of American Academy of Religion Davaney poses just this question: “Who 
has the authority to speak for or about religions?” (Davaney and Laderman 2005:980). With 
an increasing need for a global perspective on religion, Davaney connects the relevance of 
this question to current religious conflicts, whether that being Bosnia, the Middle East, or 
women’s rights (981). While this thesis focused on the struggle between presbyters and 
bishops, a pragmatic historicist perspective would be to ask about those who were not 
consulted in this matter – the ‘common’ believers. In this it is evident that pragmatic 
historicism has something to offer, on multiple layers. However, the question at hand is how 
Williams is positioned in regards to the historicist approach Davaney advocates, and are there 
in Williams a solution to the radicalness of this position. 
5.4.4 Williams and Historicism 
How, then, does Williams historicist concerns parallel those of the pragmatic 
historicist; does his views line up with Davaney's? With first glance, it is evident that they 
have similarities. As she says, “there is a clear sense in which pragmatic historicist tend to 
agree with postliberals” – no way of knowing whether one got reality right (2000:171). The 
proposal from Davaney is to allow a conversation to take place with current and past currents, 
and then make judgements on the traditions right of existence. While Williams is not a 
postliberalist, he does see history – tradition – as the place from where we derive identity - 
while at the same time writing history to make sense of identity. This constructed history is 
not ‘reality’, and as such it is not, by Williams, seen as ‘finished’, but rather progressing. Also 
with Davaney, the symbols are given attention; for one, they give identity – though with some 
possible detrimental side effects (170). Further, in pragmatic historicism, the complexities and 
the plethora of traditions are seen to interact – and from this interaction a coherent system is 
formed (Davaney 2000:40). To use my former analogy from psychology, that the diverging 
traditions are to be understood as cognitive dissonance – forcing a harmonizing story to take 
place. In this view history is never a completed work (41). Comparing Williams to pragmatic 
historicism there will of course be similarities and overlap. Neither has been allowed to 
develop in a vacuum, but rather has progressed by interacting with the challenges and 
concerns presented to them. It this respect, it seems a little simplistic and of little benefit to 
typecast a position with thick borders. However, there is a need to look closer at where they 
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differ, in order to investigate into whether or not Williams can offer a way out of historicism 
that does not lead to relativism, or pragmatic historicism. 
The difference is in regards to the essence of Christianity - to the identity of theology 
as a discipline different from science of religion. Considering what has been presented in this 
thesis, regarding the formation of the Christological doctrine, it is evident that Williams and 
Davaney share similar sentiments regarding the need to keep history open, and thus 
instructional. The statement that “religious communities or academic institutions, for 
example, come into being and function within the complex sets of social, political, and 
cultural relations that structure human existence” could have come from Williams, but it is 
Davaney whom I just quoted (2000:155). But would Williams follow Davaney when she says, 
while presenting Gordon Kaufman, that “all our notions of God are human constructions, and 
hence, like all other human creations, are open to question” (157) (italics mine)? I think not. 
They differ in the way doctrines are said to originate; to Williams there is still a revelation at 
heart of theology. 
  In his lecture given to the Diocese of Guildford he addresses some of the concerns 
touched upon above. His topic is The finality of Christ in a pluralist world. Here he starts by 
presenting how the classic conviction that what we meet in Christ is nothing less than the 
truth: the truth about God, and about man. This classical view is facing challenges today; 
challenges in regards to the moral, political and the philosophical implications of these views. 
Of these, it is the philosophical that is being addressed in this thesis: “Every truth is spoken in 
the terms of its own culture and its own times” (Williams 2010). So how then can there be 
any truth to talk of? Williams deals with this by first presenting a clarification about the truth 
claims of the New Testament: 
What the New Testament does not say is, 'unless you hold the following propositions to be 
true there is no life for you'. What it does say is, 'without a vital relationship with Jesus Christ 
who is the word of God made flesh, you will not become what you were made to be. You will 
not live into the fullness of your human destiny.' And it's this claim -- not so much about 
unique truth in a form of words but about unique relationship with Jesus -- which I want to 
explore a little with you.  (Williams 2010) 
It is not about having the right ideas, but about following him. The action of the triune God is 
to bring about a relationship, but the cultural wrapping on this expression – the words and 
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forms – are not what makes the difference (Williams 2010). This action - this promise of a 
relationship – is what enters and allows for change.  
 The truth about a relationship enters, which reveals something about God and man. In 
exemplary form: that which has entered as a nuisance, which I killed to evacuate from my 
life, this is my path to salvation. I was created to be son or daughter, but I cannot be this 
without the revelation of this relationship – by the word ‘Father’ entering my world’ - which 
again allows me to realize myself. This relationship is the eternal relationship - the truth. The 
truth is not in the words, but in something that transcends the words, in what this relationship 
says about the triune God, and, by inference, says about man. This is the new creation. “The 
finality lies in the recognition that now there is something you cannot forget about God and 
humanity, and that you cannot correct as if it were simply an interesting theory about God and 
humanity” (Williams 2010). Holding this to be true does not, according to Williams, create 
difficulties in the communication Davaney advocates. Williams says that we do not 
communicate with the intention of changing our minds, but with the intent to learn something 
(2010). Dialogue is for learning, which one is very well capable of, even if the learning 
deepens, as well as broadens, ones convictions regarding the triune God. To Williams the 
uniqueness and finality of Christ is what makes it meaningful to talk about a ‘Christian’.  
To the question of whether or not Williams is a pragmatic historicist, the answer 
seems to be ‘not quite.’ In Trinity and Pluralism he presents the Christian as one who believes 
that ‘history has shown God to be thus. What it will finally be is not something discovered in 
theory, but by encountering what is not the church’ – while at the same time committing to 
the Trinitarian creed, and the process by which it came to be (D'Costa 1990:13f) He seems to 
take seriously the concerns of historicity, and there is room for much of what has been coined 
pragmatic historicism, however there is still a core there somewhere that is final. That core is 
founded on the Christ event, and the revelation it is said to contain. To Williams this is the 
relationship between God and man, and between Godself. There is a need for a hermeneutical 
key in order to make sense of the event – and this is what is missing with Davaney – the 
finality of Christ.  
5.5 The uniqueness of Williams - Arianism as Other 
It seems fitting to close this presentation on Williams by looking closer into how his 
presentation of Arius differs from that of other renowned scholars. Williams starts of his book 
on Arius by presenting how Arius and Arianism have been understood before him. Williams 
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starts off by briefly accounting for the ‘demonizing’ of Arius, and why this is such a 
precarious foundation to build an understanding of the Nicene crisis (Williams 2005a:2). To 
illustrate this he starts off by looking closer at the preceding century and a half. In succession 
he presents, briefly, Newman, Harnack, Gwatkin, and more. What is striking with this 
presentation is that the preceding treatments almost inevitably presents Arianism as ‘the 
radically Other’ – that which differ from their view. As Lloyd Patterson writes in his review 
of Arius: heresy and tradition, Williams notes how modern interpretations treat ‘Arianism’ by 
“projecting on them the views of what various writers regarded as the opposition to mainline 
Christianity, as they understood it in their own time” (Patterson 1989:202). And in the manner 
Williams’ book began its trail on Arius, this thesis will end its trail. 
 Newman wrote an essay in 1833, The Arians of the Fourth Century, and up until that 
point, he claimed - with some merit - it had been customary to link Arianism with 
Neoplatonism, while he himself emphasised the Antiochene influence. “Arianism is the child 
of Antiochene Christianity, which […] is in thrall to Judaizing tendencies” (Williams 
2005a:3). This meant, to Newman, according to Williams, a lower view of Christ and a 
rejection of allegory, while adhering to a more literal approach. An example of a more 
enlightened church would of course be the Alexandrian one. Arianism “is the result of a 
systematic refusal of true philosophy” (4). Williams presents Newman as one who uses the 
Arians as an example of what true religion is not, thus verifying his own dogmatic standpoint. 
He defends what the early Oxford movement thought of as more spiritual religion (5), while 
the ‘judaizing tendencies’ reflects the literal approach of evangelicalism of the day. 
Harnack dealt with Arianism in volume III of his Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, 
and Williams presents him as one who, like Newman, “sees ‘Aristotelian Rationalism’ as the 
background of Arius’ system and as typical of the school of Lucian; Lucian himself is 
described as heir to the tradition of Paul of Samosata, and synthesizing Paul’s teaching with 
that of Origen” (Williams 2005a:6). Harnack himself writes that:  
Arius says that there are two wisdoms, one which is the true one and at the same time exists in 
God; through this the Son arose and by participation in it he was simply named Word and 
Wisdom; for wisdom, he says, originated through wisdom according to the will of the wise 
God. Then he also says that there is another Word apart from the Son in God, and through 
participation therein the Son himself has been again named graciously Word and Son.” This is 
the doctrine of Paul of Samos., [sic] taken over by Arius from Lucian. (2005:52)(footnote) 
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Harnack concludes that Arianism was a compromise between the Adoptian and the Logos 
Christology, and this proves that at the time in question it was impossible to not recognize 
“the personal pre-existence of Christ” (Harnack 2005:52). Williams presents Harnack as 
viewing Arius as one who emphasis on the humanity of Jesus; the Logos is a Neoplatonic 
figure who “advances in status as a result of the incarnation” (Williams 2005a:7). Logos does 
not participate in the divine life, and cannot bestow saving knowledge. Also here Arianism is 
represented as being an adversary to true spirituality, and would result in a Judaistic external 
obedience. Still, Athanasius is no hero himself. He saved the gospel from Arius, but the cost, 
according to Harnack, was too great – as Williams presents it (8).  
For Harnack, in fact, Arianism is the archetypal heresy in that it illustrates all the corruptions 
of Hellenized, Catholic Christianity without any of those features which have, historically, 
prevented Catholic Christianity from wholly losing sight of the gospel of Jesus of Nazareth – 
above all, the abiding commitment to the goal of communion with the divine life, however 
imperfectly and naturalistically this communion was understood. (Williams 2005a) 
What was at stake in the crisis was the true spiritual gospel, versus the formalistic dead 
gospel. 
The first to challenge this consensus was H. M. Gwatkin, who in his Studies of 
Arianism discredits the belief of a Jewish influence in Antioch, and goes with the pagan 
approach (9). Still, Arianism is “the result of irreverent philosophical speculation: it is ‘almost 
as much a philosophy as a religion’” (Williams 2005a:9). God’s transcendence is maintained 
by equating the Father with the isolated absolute of Middle Platonism, and the Son is made to 
be the demiurge (9). Arianism could not make sense of the relationship between creature and 
creator, and it could not support a notion of a triumphant evolutionary morality and 
philosophy (11). Gwatkin’s agenda was the promotion of welfare and enlightenment, and 
Arius was presented as ‘Other’ to this agenda. 
When Williams writes his book, the animosity towards Arius has cooled. In the 
seventies it was increasingly argued that Arius was a spiritually serious exegete, who might 
even have a soteriology (17). Is he a threat to the doctrine of grace, as Mönnich posed in1950 
(18)? Is salvation the betterment of morals; is this why it appealed to the ascetics? The 
development of the view of Arius is also a development of ‘Arianism-as-Other’ (20). And as 
the pendulum continues its turn, and the God of Athanasius is presented as one who can 
experience lack, the question can be posed: ‘did the Nicene fathers achieve not only more 
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than they knew but also more than they wanted’ (22)? When Williams comes on the scene 
there is an acute awareness of how doctrines has a life their own - apart from those who wrote 
them. This leads back to what was written in chapter 2, about the methodology of Williams in 
dealing with Arius, where he presents Johannes Fabian and his book Time and the Other: 
How Anthropology Makes its Object. What is interesting here is that Arianism-as-Other no 
longer have only negative allocations. Other is now good.  
Lloyd G. Patterson in his review of Arius also presents other aspects of Williams’ 
uniqueness in his presentation of Arius apart from what has been touched upon above. For 
instance, Patterson draws attention to how Williams argues for the dismantlement of 
‘arianism’ understood as a homogenous fraction, and rather perceives it as a post-Athanasius 
development (1989:103). Patterson himself believes Williams is correct in this, even if he 
expect this to be the subject of further discussion. Further, Williams’ presentation of the 
Alexandrian climate in regards to bishops and presbyters and how this relates to authority is 
also new. Arius was not a Lucianist, but a learned teacher of scripture – a defender of 
traditional orthodoxy at that - which combined with the Constantine era made the conflict 
more deep-rooted that it would have been at the time or Origen (204). This, however, is not a 
startling conclusion, as Patterson sees it. What is Williams more unique contribution is found 
in his dealing with ‘Arius and Philosophy”. Williams’ presentation of Arius as a critique of 
dyadic cosmology from Origen and Plato – Arius uniqueness – is also part of Williams’ 
uniqueness. There was ‘a restlessness’, as Patterson calls it (205), with the status quo – a need 
for reinterpretation – which is what Williams builds upon in his postscript (2005a:235). There 
was a need to interpret the old, with new words – even extrabiblical words. The word 
homoousion serves as a sign that “scriptural teaching could not answer the theological 
questions of the fourth century” (Patterson 1989:206). This perspective from Williams is 
something Patterson sees as a future point of debate. 
Williams was unique in that his presentation captured some of the growing concerns 
of the day in regards to the complexities of the situation – concerns that would continue to 
grow in the years to come (2005a:247). There is a plethora of factors influencing any event. 
One of his agendas in presenting the material was to show that there was a crisis brewing at 
the time in question. That Arius did not come from nowhere (266). Williams is here once 
again close to Davaney, and his historicist – perhaps even pragmatic historicist - 
understanding was, and is, part of the unique aspect he brought to bear on doctrinal theology. 
As he states in his comment to the second edition of Arius: 
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My 1987 text suggested that an Ideologiekritik of doctrinal history was a highly desirable 
prelude to any contemporary essay on the development of doctrinal language, and this is a 
commonplace of serious modern scholarship. […] My own specific suggestion about reading 
Arius’ material in social/ecclesial context have had mixed reception, and my own ideological 
slant has not been neglected by reviewers! But the principle remains. One of the most fruitful 
areas, I believe, for future research will be the history of the Church history itself. 
As with Davaney, there is with Williams an acute awareness of the need for the critique of 
any position, including ones own. As his dealings with Arius has shown, there is a case to be 
made for the acknowledgement of ideological influence on the Trinitarian doctrine, as well as 
with how this conflict came to be understood – and still is understood.  
5.6 Conclusion 
 It was asked at the beginning of this thesis what kind of implications could be drawn 
from Williams view on doctrine, as it relates to current hermeneutical issues. To this question 
an answer can now be given. The implications are, for one, that doctrines must be looked at 
with historicist eyes. This means that there is no normative standpoint to cast judgement. 
History, and doctrine as a freeze frame of history, are valuable as they challenge us as who we 
are now. This challenge allows for growth – or a “ greater fullness of Christian maturity,” as 
quoted from Williams in chapter two. When passing judgement on history, it is imperative to 
be aware of ones own position, as one will often, while reading history-as-other, typecast the 
event. This is evident when investigating into how Arius has been presented in times gone by 
– and in how he is presented now. By being Other the event also reveal something about what 
is – the reflection of recognizing other as Other. Doctrine thus reveals some of what once was, 
and some of what is. The judgement on what is to come is thus part of a dialogue.  
 This perspective addresses some of the concerns of pragmatic historicism, but there is 
one significant difference. The passing of judgement, and the dialogue taking place, does so 
one a foundation. There is one underlying symbol that defines this as ‘this, not that’. The 
identity forming symbol must have something to its essence, or it is a word devoid of content. 
Christian, in this respect, is a word based on one key event, the Christ event, and the 
revelation within that event – which, for Williams, is relationship. This reveals another major 
concern, which deserves greater attention than I here can give it, namely who is to define 
meaning to what is being revealed? I propose the answer must be in ‘the radical different’ – 
that which was not there before. There is a new word given, and this word alters everything 
by giving a new identity to God, and in consequence, to man. However, it is quite possible 
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that this word is not a closed word – it might be an everlasting word; a word that keeps 
unfolding as time moves on. And as a word it needs interpretation. The starting point for 
interpreting this new word is what is present in the Christ event. This is the foundation 
making it possible to understand what was not understandable. There is in the event a 
hermeneutical key. 
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Chapter 6: Putting it all together – The hermeneutical approach 
6.1 Introduction  
As this thesis is drawing to a close it is time to take a closer look at some possible 
consequences of what has been presented. It has not always been possible to comment on 
various issues, and perhaps propose areas of further study. Williams has been presented, and 
his uniqueness made note of. Now it is time to investigate whether or not there is a way of 
dealing with doctrine that can address all the concerns raised. This section will have a future 
oriented perspective, while also attempting to tie up any loose ends. 
 I will in this section give a recap of what has been presented up until now. From this I 
will also make some extensive comments. In addition to this I will present a hermeneutical 
approach to doctrine, and comment on how it meets concerns raised - that being the historical 
character of doctrine, or how, as with Williams, it needs to be grounded in an event. From this 
I will also present my own proposal of what might be a beneficial path in dealing with 
doctrines. 
6.2 Recap 
 It might benefit the reader with a brief recap of some of the central notions presented 
in this thesis while I at the same time comment on them. 
6.2.1 Chapter two  
In chapter two an attempt was given to present Williams doctrinal position. This was 
done by looking closer at specific topics, like history, identity, intention, denominational 
influence, and doctrines. History was regarded as a teacher – an Other - entering, provoking. 
History is also written as a result of a crisis - a rupture in the constructed grid. This led to an 
understanding of identity as instrumental in the writing of history; it tried to remove the 
tension caused by the rupture. In addition to this, Williams’ theological intention was also 
presented. He believes theology should be communicative, celebratory and critical. Theology 
needs to remain open for this to be the case. The challenges Williams presents are not solely 
of an Anglican concern - even if the Anglican Church has a tradition for being ‘open’. In 
conclusion Williams doctrinal view was addressed more explicitly. Doctrines are symbols in 
need of interpretation. They are not equated with truth, but they contain truth – which has to 
be released in a continuing process. The symbols reflect how the writers attempted to make 
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sense of rupture – of history - based on their identity. Doctrines are identity statements that 
can guide the reader towards greater maturity; they reveal the truth said to be contained in the 
event by forcing the reader to position himself according to this foreign fragment being 
inserted into his life. 
 With Williams there is no normative time - no objective vantage point. The conflict 
and dialogue present in history, brought to attention by dealing with this history, moves 
history forward. By encountering this Other our contemporary position is revealed for what it 
is. By understanding how we became what we are, we understand better why we are what we 
are. This is what Williams means when he states that by dealing with the Arian controversy 
we become more aware of what we in our doctrinal ‘present’ owe, negatively and positively, 
to Arius (2005a:9), which is also mirrored by Davaney (152). Knowing more of the ‘whys’ 
enables a more knowledgeable judgement on what is. Orthodoxy is a work in the making – as 
both pragmatic historicism and Williams would have us believe. It is difficult to talk about 
absolutes, and the theologian can never know which doctrinal form that will succeed best in 
the future. As Williams says, “there is no absolute locus standi above the struggle; there is, 
ideally, a continuing conversation that must be exploratory and innovative even when it is 
also polemical. Orthodoxy continues to be made” (2005a:25). What is of utmost importance 
in doctrinal theology is dialogue. 
History and identity can then said to be part of a circular loop: Identity is formed based 
on history, and history is written in order to make sense of identity. How is one to make sense 
of this apparent inconsistency? This circle between two factors, identity and history, sounds a 
lot like the hermeneutical circle, where the factors are preunderstanding and Other. Is identity 
then a result of encountering history as Other, thus forcing a redefinition of the self? But does 
this explain where the initial identity came from? I propose that there is, in a sense, a gift 
presented. Identity is not just developed, it originates as given. Something is handed to me, 
without me recognizing the gift as gift, and so freeing me from the obligation of returning the 
gift. I simply have something that I did not previously possess – and this possession entered 
my life by an event. Identity is thus given by encountering an event where the ‘I’ is 
experienced as something different than ‘that’. History is then something happening to 
identity – which also reveals how there already is an identity before history happens. Identity 
is thus already present, but revealed by history – by limitation of the identity. I experience 
myself as already present before I experience myself at all; I am given to myself, but this 
given is hidden, so as to be a true gift. A group can experience difference – we used to be that, 
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but now we’re this – which would imply a new identity taking place. If so identity is again the 
result of encountering history: we (I) used to be a sinner, but now we are (I am) saved. This 
would again lead back into the circle. My proposition was to incorporate the notion of gift 
into the circle. By this I am asking if there is not something happening before the encounter: a 
sense of connection to the newness arising in me before the encounter, making the event 
recognisable. If so, there is in the Christ event – before the Christ event – a sense of “this has 
relevance for me; I am connected to this somehow – the ‘I’ is intertwined with the ‘we’.” 
Motion is part of history, of formation, of identity, of transition from ‘this’ to ‘that’. Still, 
before motion can take place, before the process, there is pre-presence, or pre-sense, of that 
which is forced to move. 
 There is more to identity than language. Identity is open, purposeful, formative and 
communal. Doctrines, as symbols of identity, are meant to be open, purposeful, formative and 
communal. Still, if symbols only reflect back on other symbols in infinite regression, then 
they are hard-pressed to contain any real meaning at all. However, if there is a given behind 
the language, behind the symbols, then there is a sense where the language, self-referring as it 
might be, revolves around a centre. The centre might not be communicable apart from 
symbols, but it is nonetheless there. This means that by engaging with the symbols, one can 
hope that the transformation it provokes, and the formative result, moves one closer to the 
essence of what is given.  
6.2.2 Chapter three 
In chapter 3 I analyzed how Williams presented Arius as a theological conservative. 
To do this he showed how socio-political and theological factors contributed to the 
ostracizing of Arius. There was not a ‘heretic’ versus ‘Catholic’ struggle, because there were 
no such distinct fractions. ‘Arianism’ is a term coined by a post-Nicene vantage point. What 
was at stake in the conflict was rather, among other issues, questions about authority. Add to 
this the need for peace in the newly united empire under Constantine, and one soon 
understands that this conflict was more complex then it has typically been presented as. Arius 
was a conservative Alexandrian, in that his theology attempted to deal with issues that had a 
long standing tradition in Alexandria. Arius attempted to deal with these issues in light of his 
overarching hermeneutical concern: the freedom and transcendence of God. This supports 
what has been stated above, regarding doctrine as the result of a process – a process trying to 
make sense of an event. 
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 The conflict arose out of different theologians attempts to preserve key notions 
regarding the economia of God in light of theologia: how does what can be said (or not said) 
about God (his being) affect the understanding of what has happened through Christ (God’s 
dealings with what is not God)? Arius emphasized God’s immutability and his free will, while 
others emphasised more the sonship of the Logos, and his position as theos. Returning to 
Eusebius of Caesarea, and his opposition to the emanation metaphor – the Fathers free will 
must mean that the Son was created at a later point, prior to creation, although not ex nihilo – 
it is again more apparent why Arius was considered a rallying point against Alexander 
(Williams 2005a:173). “[Arius] theology is clearly the result of a very large number of 
theological views converging towards a crisis at the end of the third century” (171). It would 
be easy to do as Athanasius and throw all of these conflicting notions into one basket in an 
attempt to unify a heterogeneous group to one homogenous identity. However, what is at 
stake here is not individual theological preferences, but what can intelligibly be said about 
God, and how does this affect an understanding of the Christ event as a revelatory event: God 
chooses to reveal himself, but what is it he reveals? 
The struggle for orthodoxy needs to be understood as an historical process. As such, it 
is susceptible to critical interpretation – not to discredit it, nor make judgements on it – in 
order for it to be relevant and able to mature those engaged. Arius had a specific agenda; as 
had Alexander. Arius wanted to keep the interpretation in the hands of the teachers, while 
Alexander wanted harmony within the church. This authority struggle mixed with a different 
emphasis on what hermeneutical key should be used to make sense of the revelatory event 
and thus played it’s part in the formation of the Christological doctrine. Crisis, conflict, 
doctrine. What can be learned from this is how one overarching concern will affect all 
interpretation. There is a key hermeneutical notion behind the pontification; one identity 
defining concept giving meaning to a description of something as ‘this, not that.’  
6.2.3 Chapter four 
Chapter 4 discussed how Arius could be considered a radical, and how this influenced 
theology, according to Williams. He interacts with traditional ideas, but he reaches some 
untraditional conclusions. Williams presents him as one who has left the world of Middle-
Platonisism, and come closer to a Neoplatonic world. God is not knowable through creation, 
and all that can be said of him is that he is free. This is the core of Arius’ heresy, and it leads 
to, for Williams, an unattainable position where the role of the Logos as eikon of god is 
effectively dismantled, and substituted with an arbitrary God.  
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The result of the Nicene crisis was theology. Williams presents the controversy as 
needing to take new steps – develop new words, even extrabiblical ones – in order to preserve 
what they saw as a key to their identity. The event provoked a new identity that had to be 
preserved. To Williams this identity is ‘new creation, and it is based on an event.  
 A key point for this thesis is what Williams says about Arius: “Like any Christian 
theologian, Arius cannot but start from the fact of renewed or reconstructed experience of 
God, arising not from human endeavour, but from the event of Jesus Christ” (2005a:226). 
Arius was not trying to make theology fit philosophy, or vice versa; he was trying to make 
sense of the Christ event by employing all the resources he had at his disposal, which 
included philosophy. A philosophical framework did influence Arius’ hermeneutics, but it 
only served as a foundation upon where Arius could build a case for his overarching concern. 
When making sense of the event he first analyzed the event within his pre-existing 
hermeneutical framework, and in so doing needed to make the event make sense considering 
the free will and immutability of God. The event created the dissonance, and Neoplatonism 
gave the tools to unify the conflicting notions. 
 Considering what Williams has presented, I suggest a larger scope of focus in dealing 
with doctrine. Arius and Alexander both tried to preserve one key notion. This key notion is 
what interacts with history, and in so doing is allowed to grow. With the church there appears 
to be many such notions, or seeds. There are differing ways of explaining the event – differing 
notions as to what is at stake; as to what the event is said to contain. The idea of a harmonious 
entity called the church - based on a clear distinct notion - is a heuristic. It is far more 
complex. Instead of a single notion that is self-evident, there are many – some of whom are 
even conflicting. Still, this diversity is ‘diversity in unity’ in that all the little seeds originate 
from the same event – thus making the event the mother of all the notions. Then instead of 
attempting to uncover the ’true’ seed, the correct notion, doctrinal theology would be well 
served by looking at the larger picture - a picture where all the conflicting notions are trying 
to make sense of an event. This would welcome diversity, and invite dialogue. The event 
would remain open, and would be allowed to be interpreted inside of a community structure, 
which Williams advocates. Authority, in this case, would reside with that community – 
perhaps even with spirituality, and if so be closer to Arius than Alexander. 
 I would also like to point out that the problem Arius dealt with is not of an irrelevant 
nature for modern theology. How the Son and the Father can be same but different still 
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imposes interesting challenges on the theologian. If, as it has been proposed, identity is the 
result of facing the Other – by recognizing that I am ‘this’, not ‘that’ – then there is an acute 
awareness of separation present in the formation of identity. An individual will perceive 
himself to be just that, an individual, because he encounters that which he is not. When faced 
with an Other he realizes that this Other is closed off from him. He has no access to it. It is 
different because it is not known. If he had access to the Other, the Other would dissolve; it 
would be swallowed up in familiarity. The distinction between ‘this’ and ‘that’ is 
unfamiliarity; something is not known. One cannot understand the Other in its Otherness. 
This has implications on the understanding of the trinity. If the Son is an Other to the 
Father – a distinct individual – then the Son will not be what the Father is. This jeopardizes 
the monotheistic fundament, and the freedom of God. And this is what Arius was attempting 
to save. It appears that the way out of this is to say that the Son is not an Other to the Father, 
which means the Father has complete access to the Son. If the Father has complete access, if 
there is not a recognition of something as closed off, then the Son is simply a part of the 
Father. Distinction is swallowed up in sameness. The reverse question would be whether or 
not the Father is an Other to the Son. If he is not, then there really is no Son to talk about, 
because the two words encompass the same ‘area’. It appears the way out of this would be to 
say that the Father is an Other to the Son. The Son does not have complete access to the 
Father. If this proposition stands, then the Son is subordinate to the Father, and though he is 
theos he is not ho theos. The ‘oneness’ of the trinity would thus be of a hierarchical order, 
where ‘Godness’ flows down, not up. The Son is homoousios with the Father, and a distinct 
hypostasis, but the Father is not a hypostasis of the divine ousia. If he were then he would not 
be the first principle, but rather give witness to the first principle, which could continue ad 
infinitum. If this proposition holds up, then it would also have consequences into other 
doctrines – consequences that, unfortunately, are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
6.2.4 Chapter five  
Chapter 5 dealt with doctrinal criticism. Williams was presented alongside 
contemporary doctrinal concerns, where his views on doctrines as language, and his 
historicism concerns were evaluated. It was revealed that while parts of Williams’ viewpoints 
could be ascribed to a postliberalist and a pragmatic historicist position, nonetheless he could 
not comfortably be placed in either category. What arose from this presentation was a 
confirmation of the need for taking these concerns seriously: there is no normative vantage 
point in evaluation of doctrine – and this recognition also presents the need to critically 
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evaluate ones own position. To do this dialogue is needed. Where Williams differed was in 
his concern for the finality of Christ. While Williams might have a Bultmanian approach to 
the death and resurrection of Christ, he still presents the event as one of revelatory 
significance: it reveals the ‘new creation’ as one of relationship. There is something now 
revealed about God that cannot be forgotten – it is this that serves as a foundation for an 
identity as Christian. Thus there is with Williams an acute sense of ‘this’, not ‘that’ in 
describing what is Christian, thus effectively distancing himself from relativism. There is a 
hermeneutical key. 
 Another important aspect presented by Williams is the need for Ideologiekritik. 
Arianism has been typecast as the Other to whatever position was considered orthodox by the 
writer. Williams emphatically states that orthodoxy continues to be made, and so a beneficial 
area of study would be the history of church history itself. How has history been presented, 
and within what ideological framework? This also speaks to a need for self-awareness in 
dealing with the material, and with history. 
 From what has been presented above, there is a need for a doctrinal theology that can 
meet all of these concerns. It needs to keep the narrative open, to allow for identity to 
develop. It also needs to come to terms with the historical aspect of the revelation, while at 
the same time not presenting the revelation as inaccessible. This view not only needs to 
critically investigate the history of doctrine, but also perform the same analysis on its own 
position. To do this it needs to allow for dialogue; a dialogue that is aimed at greater 
understanding and respect for one’s tradition, and not a version where one leaves the old – the 
synthesis does not erase the thesis. There is an identity to consider; a ‘this’ not ‘that’ opposing 
a relativist approach. This identity, while being open and verbal, speaks of something hidden 
in the event, and perhaps something given before the event. There is a sense in which this 
event is relevant to ‘me’, and for which ‘I’ am allowed to be transformed. The process then 
commenced is one in which this ‘I’ is to be revealed. There is also the acknowledgement that 
this ‘I’ being developed is connected to what happened, which forces the question why it 
happened, seeing that it happened to me. The answer to why God choose to do it thusly – why 
death and resurrection – is acutely connected to who I am, and so, to quote Williams yet 
again: 
We begin with a sense of identity that is in some way fragile or questionable, and we embark 
on the enterprise of history to make it clearer and more secure. In the process, of course, 
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definitions may change a good deal, but the aim is to merge with some fuller sense of who we 
are. (2005b:23) 
Answers to the fundamental questions are important because they say something about the 
questioner. The why this way, at this time and so forth needs to be dealt with. Doctrinal 
theology needs to consider all these aspects, so is there a system that can be helpful in this 
respect? 
6.3 Hermeneutics of doctrine 
 Anthony Thiselton is by many seen as an authority on hermeneutics, and his book 
from 2007, the Hermeneutics of Doctrine deals with many of these concerns. In this book 
Thiselton investigates whether a more significant interaction between hermeneutics and 
doctrine can be formed. The reason for this attempt was based on how doctrines seemed to 
have become marginalized and detached from the life of the Christian community (xvi). 
Doctrines are theoretical phenomenons without real impact on the life of the believer. 
Thiselton, reflecting Rahner, believes it would be more beneficially viewed in terms like 
understanding, listening and truth. These are words Thiselton find echoed in Gadamer, 
speaking of hermeneutics. Hermeneutics is about understanding, and it is formative by 
“keeping oneself open to what is the other…” (xvii). It also has a communal dimension, 
which further ties in with doctrines. This communal dimension is connected to identity: 
“doctrines does not rest on the consensus of the church”, as Thiselton quote Pannenberg, 
though there is a “communality of knowledge that leads to the intersubjective identity of the 
subject matter” (xvii). Lindbeck's perspective of doctrines as “communal phenomenons that 
shapes the subjectives of individuals rather than being primarily a manifestation of those 
subjectives” is also emphasized (xviii). Thiselton thus connects hermeneutics with doctrine in 
terms of resonance, which he continues to elaborate upon. 
 In relation to this thesis three topics will be dealt with in regards to the hermeneutics 
of doctrine. These are related to dialogue, truth and identity. The reason for presenting these 
topics is that they are connected to concerns already addressed in this thesis: What 
methodological standpoint should one adhere to in the critical analysis of doctrine? Is there 
truth to be found in doctrine? And how is all of this connected to identity?  
6.3.1 Dialogue 
 Thiselton’s hermeneutical approach manages to take seriously the self-awareness 
Davaney calls for. The means by which it does this is also similar, namely dialogue. Thiselton 
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himself uses this ideal of dialogue in his own book, by conversing with different philosophers 
and theologians. Kenneth Archer points out this conversation in his review of the 
Hermeneutics of Doctrine, and states that “with this work [Thiselton] hopes to demonstrate 
how approaching doctrine through the resources of contemporary hermeneutics may provide 
means to rightly retrieve the importance of doctrine for the communal life of the church” 
(Archer 2009:151). There is in the hermeneutical approach to doctrine a strong sense of the 
need for conversation with different partners. 
 This dialogue, and this self-awareness, is part of the two different kinds of horizons of 
understanding Thiselton presents. The first of these is related to communication, while the 
other concerns truth – both are though part of a relationship and interact. As Thiselton 
describes it: 
The first kind of hermeneutical horizon concerns the formulation of initial preunderstanding 
(or a readiness to understand) on the part of those who seek to understand. It relates to the 
attempt to identity points of engagement between the interpreter and the subject matter. The 
second kind of hermeneutical horizon is different. This seeks to identify what the “otherness” 
of the doctrinal subject matter demands as a horizon within which its claims will be heard 
without distortion and without the interpreter’s imposing alien questions, concepts, and 
conceptual worlds upon it. (2007:xx) (italics his) 
Saving the second horizon for later, the first horizon – that of communication - can do well 
with further elaboration. The first horizon attempts to discover preunderstanding which 
makes it possible for people to have their already existing horizons find “a point of overlap or 
engagement with that which has yet to be understood” (311). Thiselton ties this in with the 
question of whether the message of the cross needed different words in communicating to the 
Hellenistic mijeu as compared to the Jewish-Palestinian (lordship rather than kingdom of 
God). While this hypothesis has been undermined, the topic is still relevant. Thiselton also 
uses the example of Paul, and if it is wrong to read him with a Lutheran process in mind 
(alienation from God leads to the cross). The point here is not about what is the ‘correct’ 
reading, but rather the fundamental notion behind the interpretation, which from a 
hermeneutical perspective is: “someone else has done something for us that we are incapable 
of doing for ourselves” (311 italics his). Apart from a valuable insight into the how the 
hermeneutical aspect makes the fundamental of the event relatable – we know what it means 
that someone does something for us we ourselves cannot do – the value is also in how 
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different horizons overlap – this was one regarding a theology of the cross – and thus how 
they can be discussed. 
  Archer writes on the first horizon that it is the current context, and that from this 
context critical questions arise. These questions are answered by approaching the other 
horizon, that of scripture and doctrine (2009:152).  
The theologian who utilizes ‘hermeneutics’ in the service of doctrine begins by asking current 
‘motivated questions that arise from life’ and with such pressing questions moves back to the 
horizon of Scripture, into the history of doctrinal development, and back to the current horizon 
in an attempt to meaningfully respond to the contemporary questions with a biblically sound 
Christian doctrine (Archer 2009:152) 
This is the hermeneutical procedure, and it thus considers one’s own position, as well as the 
truth said to be in the past. In this process – this dialogue – the Other is again employed for 
the formation of the individual. The two horizons of Thiselton thus address concerns of 
Davaney, with self-reflection, and the concerns of Williams, with history being influential in 
the formation of the individual. At the same time there is never a sense of completion – there 
is no normative standpoint, no ahistoric truth – while at the same time not ending up in 
relativism. 
6.3.2 Truth 
 The second hermeneutical horizon is concerning the truth. Truth and hermeneutics are 
interconnected, as Archer points out: “hermeneutics is concerned about communication, 
historical distance, linguistic significance, and epistemological issues pertaining to truth” 
(2009:152). Thiselton states explicitly in the introduction to his book that “[he] strongly urge 
the importance of coherence as a criterion of truth” (2007:xx). This coherence approach to 
truth attempts to be pragmatic when balancing the need for coherence with the role of 
polyphony, dialectics and the system as open – it strives towards growth, not closure.  
 Thiselton when dealing with coherence draws on the works of Schleiermacher and 
Pannenberg, among other. When trying to resolve the dichotomy between doctrine 
ecclesiologically understood as “objective” truth, and the hermeneuts ideal of keeping the 
system open, he resorts to the contribution of Schleiermacher (2007:120). Schleiermacher 
argued for the separation of hermeneutics and theology, because to often in the past the 
theologian had used hermeneutics to substantiate his already existing notions on the subject. 
Hermeneutics needed its independence to effectively critique theology. At the same time there 
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is not complete understanding, as that would imply grasping “the whole”. Thiselton further 
asks if the incompatibility between doctrine and hermeneutics is “the provisionality and 
corrigibility of judgements in hermeneutics (122 italics his). As he sees it, this would only be 
superficial disagreement, because in the protestant tradition there is an acute awareness of the 
fallibility of the church, and of man in general.  
 Thiselton moves from Schleiermacher into a discussion about the role of a “centre” in 
interpretation. The centre is where the individual parts are understood, by the whole they 
belong to. This again is from Schleiermacher, where, on one side, there is the need for 
historical interpretation to do justice to the historical time and place of the biblical authors. On 
the other side complete knowledge is dependent upon complete knowledge of the person, his 
language, and the choices available to him. “Complete knowledge always involves an 
apparent circle: that each part can be understood only out of the whole to which it belongs and 
vice versa” (124). This leads to a centre, which several scholars have attempted to identity in 
Paul: freedom from Jewish law, eschatology, salvation and so on. The search for a centre does 
not make everything else peripheral, but it receives relevance in every particularity (125).  
 Thiselton draws often on Pannenberg, perhaps because of the latter’s emphasis on 
“Truth as coherence”, which entails “the mutual agreement of all that is true” (125 italics 
his). Coherence serves as valid judgement of Christianity because it is a generally accepted 
criteria – a notion of truth that is “true” outside of the system of Christianity. This does not 
close the system for Pannenberg, It is provisionally awaiting the eschaton, which is the first 
point Thiselton makes. The second is “if truth is derived from the living God who acts in 
ongoing history, the truth of doctrine and truth of God is disclosed ‘in a contingent manner’ 
… Contingent events are the basis of historical experience. … The truth of God must prove 
itself anew in the future. … [even if] the truth of God embraces all other truth” (125 sic). 
Seeing as the truth is presented in historical form, it must be subjected to continued evaluation 
so that the truth in the event is not lost in the history. 
 Pannenberg further insists, as reported by Thiselton, on how knowledge is mediated 
by “revelation” (126). Truth is thus not the result of a mere consensus, even if the community 
plays its part. It is the belief in this truth that justifies the existence of Christian churches 
(126). The formational identity of the church is the revelation said to be found in the Christ 
event. 
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6.3.3 Identity 
 In regards to identity several of the topics mentioned above have relevance. Doctrine 
in it self is identity defining in how it creates a boundary. Archer comments on this, stating 
that doctrine, at best, serves this function – defining true and false beliefs about God 
(2009:151). He goes on to state that to Thiselton doctrine has a “dispositional function which 
forms and transforms Christian identity and practice because the personal confession of 
doctrine as truth claim involves much more than a simple cognitive affirmation” (151). By 
once again using the metaphor of language, and by referring to Wittgenstein, it is possible to 
propose a connection between words and identity, as Stephen Williams says it “words and 
concepts gain their meaning from their function in shaping a form of life” (Williams 
2009:180). This is reminiscent of the other Williams, and how he described the need in the 
early Christian community for new words (chapter 2). Doctrine is identity forming, and this 
identity is connected with the truth and with the community. There is something, a revelation, 
which the community is trying to make sense of; this makes it possible to justify the existence 
of this community in the first place. 
 I would like to emphasize that the two horizons presented imply a subject – an object 
of identity present in the dialogue. This is also the case with Davaney, in which the critique of 
one’s own position naturally reveals the presence of a ‘one’. The dialogue taking place 
between the subject and its surroundings – past and present – says something about the 
subject who is trying to make sense of it all. Archer speaks of the community who enters into 
a relationship with the Other in order to receive greater understanding (2009:152), which of 
course reflects the two horizons above. I emphasize this because I believe this notion – this 
identity – is of fundamental value in how theology is to critically encounter doctrine. 
6.4 The radical different 
 It may now have become apparent that I place a good deal of emphasis on identity in 
regards to doctrine. The reason for this, apart from concerns presented by the various 
theologians presented in this thesis, is what I perceive as a need for a distinct Christian 
identity. When dealing with issues of historicism and truth it is so easy to slip into a state of 
pragmatic agnosticism in terms of faith. This is not to say that these contemporary concerns 
are not merited, rather it is more a question of what it is they are preformed on. As with 
Davaney, and pragmatic historicism, it almost seems like the conclusions she draws are closer 
to a science of religion rather than a theology, per se. The same can be said for other 
theologians presented in this thesis, like Lindbeck. The reason I say this is what I perceive as 
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a lack of distinct identity in their theology. First of all, something happened. This is the 
hermeneutical starting point. As a result of this event, a new identity was developed: there 
was a “new creation”. Christianity is irrevocably connected to this event to the point where if 
you remove the event, you also remove any outside reference to the word Christian – it is 
‘this’ not ‘that’. If Christian is simply a linguistic term, with a constructed content, flexible 
enough to incorporate any new perspective – if ‘Christian’ is what we define it to be – then 
one ignores the event, and the identity given. 
 The word ‘Christian’ is connected to an identity. This identity is connected to an 
event. What this event is said to contain is not obvious. This is where the hermeneutical 
approach can be helpful. As when Thiselton presents the debate regarding a “centre” in the 
theology of Paul, or as this thesis has presented a “centre” in the theology of Arius – and of 
Alexander - they all had one overarching concern, a ‘whole’, that influenced the individual 
elements, the ‘parts’. This could be the freedom of God, the role of the Son as eikon, or a 
variety of other concerns. I propose that behind all of this there is a ‘bigger’ concern. 
Something happened, which they are all trying to make sense of. My suggestion is that what 
happened was something radically different. 
 The radical different is a hermeneutical key that makes room for various notions 
arising. If what happened was so different, then there was not a proper contextual framework 
present to make sense of it, which means that one did the best one could with what was 
available. This is of course not that different from what happens in any event, apart from one 
aspect: the radical different. The similarities are in the tools of understanding – using the 
framework present, be that cultural, philosophical, religious or more. The radicalness is in 
what this event claimed to represent: a revelation. Something came into the framework that 
was not there before. A new word not yet defined. What this word is, this Logos, is what is 
not stated. All we know is that the word, not of this world, came to this world – and that this 
act was of huge significance. It had to do with who God is and who man is; it had to do with 
identity. The clarity of this revelatory event can be discussed. It did happen in history, with all 
that it implies. One still needed to interpret the revelation according to what was already 
present, thus inevitably resulting in various notions, or fractions. 
 The radical different allows for the openness of the process. Seeing as the revelation 
had a place in time and space, and thus is limited, the truth it is said to contain needs to be 
unwrapped. One cannot escape space-time, so the unwrapping is never completed, so to 
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speak. There is only one revelation, limited to an event – to a man. At the same time it is not 
finished. It still seeks to reveal what is said to be in the event to man today, in his own 
language. Dialogue with the full array of community structures is of paramount importance in 
order to remain relevant - while at the same time not being absorbed into them. 
 The radical different serves as an identifying marker. It is a border helping keep ‘this’ 
as ‘this’, not ‘that’. In encountering the complex array of societal structures, there is still an 
acute awareness of distinction between ‘the radical different’ and ‘the different’: is what is 
being encountered of ‘radical’ or ‘societal’ origin? In making this distinction, one is 
attempting to uncover more of the Christian identity’s distinctiveness, rather than its sameness 
with other societal structures: ‘this” is not ‘that’. This quest for distinctiveness is not by any 
means an attempt to create a dichotomy – nor is the ideal to draw distinct lines between ‘this’ 
and ‘that’. The goal is to preserve a distinct identity. 
 The distinct identity developed does allow for other notions, while at the same time 
aiding in keeping perspective. The notion of something happening that was radically different 
gives understanding to why it is not easy to define precisely what is at the centre. This gives 
room for varying, even conflicting, notions to grow side by side. The perspective is kept by 
realizing that ‘this’ is not ‘that’. This might be helpful in dealing with, for instance, notions 
and understandings such as the social gospel, liberation theology or other ethically 
emphasizing notions. The question that can be asked is “does this notion come to terms with 
the radicalness of the event?” To simplify: “is ethics and social concern something that would 
not be possible without the Christ event taking place?” If the answer to these questions opens 
the position to the idea of there being more to the event, then this is not to say that it is not a 
Christian position. Far from it. It is just an acknowledgement that there is more to be revealed, 
and that one must resist closing the position. The overall motion of theology must be directed 
towards uncovering what this radical difference is, and this is done by dialogue. 
 The dialogue taking place does so on distinct premises. By the Christian identity being 
grounded in reality by an event, in practicality by a hermeneutical key, it will not dissolve into 
the Other. The Other serves a formational purpose. The ‘Christian’ encounter the Other, and 
from this encounter maturing occurs. While the primary sources for this is tradition, 
community, scripture and so forth, it is impossible not to interpret these sources in light of a 
broader spectre. The acknowledgement of this means that theology is free to interact with 
other sciences, like physics, philosophy, the humanities etc. – which it of course has done 
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from the start whether it was ‘permitted’ to or not. There is interaction between the Christian 
identity and the Other – but in respectable terms. The Other is not allowed to do violence to 
the identity by overpowering it.  
 The radical different is a hermeneutical tool, and as such it leans on coherence to 
make judgements on truth. It is not a “truth key”, although it does rest on the premise of there 
being truth to be found. From what has hopefully become apparent in this thesis, one will 
inevitably employ a hermeneutical key in dealing with the material, so what I am advocating 
here is a greater understanding of this in regards to defining a Christian identity. It might very 
well be that my suggestion does not hold up to closer analysis, but what I am above all aiming 
for, is the growing awareness for the need of this analysis. What is the primary hermeneutical 
tool that will allow for a distinct Christian identity to be revealed? With this I once again side 
with Williams, in that this needs to be a collective enterprise – an ecclesiological undertaking. 
I hope that by performing this analysis we shall come out of the experience with a fuller sense 
of who we are. 
6.5 Concluding remarks 
 This chapter has attempted to discuss more freely some of the concerns presented by 
this thesis. I did this by first doing a recap of what has been presented, and then commenting 
on some of the issues presented. This lead to a need for a way of dealing with doctrine that 
could meet these concerns, and I then proceeded to present a hermeneutical approach as one 
that could be beneficial. In closing I presented my personal view of what I believe can be a 
beneficial approach to theology, and doctrine.  
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Chapter 7: In closing 
7.1 Answers  
 In the introduction to this thesis a problem statement was presented, along with three 
sub questions aimed at helping to resolve the problem statement. At the end of this thesis it is 
only proper to give this questions their answers. I will do this by first answering the sub-
question, and then use those answer to build the case for the answer to the problem statement. 
 The first sub question was: What kind of hermeneutical platform does Williams build 
in his dealings with the material? To this an answer can now be given. Williams build a 
hermeneutical platform where openness is of fundamental importance. In his dealings with 
the material he aims to show how what happened was not as simple – or as closed – as one 
might be tempted to think. He also places large emphasis on the need to view the formation of 
the Christological doctrine as the result of a process. By seeing it as a process, it is more 
evident that the process is not done. It is still taking place, with the intention of bringing the 
believer to greater maturity. 
 The second sub question was: What does the material, as presented by Rowan 
Williams, say about the formation of doctrine? The material Williams presents gives support 
for his hermeneutical platform. The Christological doctrine is the result of multiple factors of 
a historicist nature. There were socio-political, theological and philosophical factors that 
influenced both Arius, and his opponents. There was not a distinct ‘catholic’ versus ‘heretic’ 
fraction. The lines were far blurrier. According to the material the formation of doctrine is a 
complex affair, with a huge array of influencing factors – all of them of an historical nature. 
 The third sub question was: What kind of implications can be drawn from this view on 
doctrine as it relates to current hermeneutical issues? The implications from what has been 
presented shows that doctrines are historical entities, and as such liable to critique of an 
historicist nature. This has implications on how the truth claim of doctrines is to be met, and 
in how rigid doctrines are. The implications could almost lead to relativism, or at least to 
pragmatic historicism, if it had not been for the role of doctrines as symbols of identity. And it 
is this identity that gives content to doctrines: they are true in that they speak of an event that 
was true - a true event claiming to reveal truth. There is thus a presence of truth in doctrine – 
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not in the words, per se, but in that they guide towards a greater understanding of this truth by 
presenting itself as Other. 
The problem statement for this thesis was: In what way can Rowan Williams’ dealings 
with the Arian controversy, and the subsequent formation of the Christological doctrine, give 
greater understanding to the process surrounding the formation of doctrine? From the 
answers above it is evident that Williams dealings with the event gives greater understanding 
to how doctrine is formed, and in so doing what challenges doctrinal theology faces. This 
gives greater understanding for the role of doctrinal theology, and reveals the need to 
critically assess on what grounds doctrines are to be evaluated. As a consequence of this 
doctrinal theology serves a greater function then simply being an archaeological enterprise. It 
is responsible for presenting the event in a manner that give understanding to how it has been 
understood, while at the same time being relevant enough to still communicate. This 
communication, with the community and with the Other, is what makes doctrines still 
relevant, and still able to speak truly about God. 
I also believe that this thesis suggest that behind every interpretation there is a 
hermeneutical key. Before doctrine develops, and before theology is written, there is an 
overarching concern that needs to be dealt with. This concern is the result of a crisis of 
identity. An event has taken place, introducing a foreign element into my life, which I need to 
make sense of. Williams describes the result as history. Speaking of Christian doctrine, the 
foreign element is the revelation said to be in the Christ event. This sparks the Christian 
history. With all of this in mind I believe a rewarding path for future research will be on just 
what hermeneutical key we are meant to be given in the revelation event. Perhaps the ‘seed’ 
(1John 3.9), the ‘mysterion’ (Col 1.26f) and the keys to the kingdom of heaven (Matt 16.19) 
have something to do with a new mindset (Eph 4.23) – a new hermeneutical key? This is of 
course only hypothetical guesswork, but an interesting notion. In any case I believe this thesis 
ends on a high note: if doctrines are open, and theology is open, then one is tempted to believe 
it is this way by design. If so, this means that there are still more mysteries to unravel, and 
more treasures to be found. 
7.2 Suggestion for future study 
 I presented a few suggestions in the previous chapter that could not be developed 
fully. They might not stand up to further analysis, but they might prove to present new 
valuable insight. The giveness of an identity could do well with further development. This is 
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also the case with the slightly irregular presentation of the divine trinity. I am not entirely 
confident in that the simple presentation of the dilemma did justice to the complexity of the 
situation. Also, my suggestion to use the radical different as a hermeneutical key has not been 
developed properly, and should perhaps not be presented until further work had been done. 
My intention for doing so was simply to throw my two cents in, and hopefully by that create a 
good conversation. 
 Furthermore, what I see as an interesting path for future study would be to look at how 
the message would look if the hermeneutical key behind the interpretation came from a 
contemporary framework. This was originally some of what this thesis hoped to do, and it 
was asked in chapter 1 if we can deduce a relevant Christological understanding by 
employing the intellectual constraints of the era, but due to the magnitude of the topic it was 
not possible to treat this fully. However, I still believe it would be interesting to ask the 
question: “What would the dogmatic consequences be if the event took place today?” The 
Christological doctrine was developed with a 4th century intellectual backdrop. What would 
have happened if it had a 21st century backdrop? What would happen if Christ was read 
against current cosmological concerns, or with quantum physics in mind? Would this affect 
the understanding of what happened in the event, and if so, what would it do to the Christian 
identity? These questions, and others of similar nature, will be left alone for now, but at some 
point doctrinal theology, with its ideal of being communicable, should deal with this. It might 
bring us closer to the radical differentness of the event. 
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